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Abstract
The increasing number of repeated malware penetrations into official mobile app markets
poses a high security threat to the confidentiality and privacy of end users’ personal and
sensitive information. Protecting end user devices from falling victims to adversarial apps
presents a technical and research challenge for security researchers/engineers in academia
and industry. Despite the security practices and analysis checks deployed at app markets,
malware sneak through the defenses and infect user devices. The evolution of malware
has seen it become sophisticated and dynamically changing software usually disguised
as legitimate apps. Use of highly advanced evasive techniques, such as encrypted code,
obfuscation and dynamic code updates, etc., are common practices found in novel mal-
ware. With evasive usage of dynamic code updates, a malware pretending as benign app
bypasses analysis checks and reveals its malicious functionality only when installed on a
user’s device.
This dissertation provides a thorough study on the use and the usage manner of
dynamic code updates in Android apps. Moreover, we propose a hybrid analysis approach,
StaDART, that interleaves static and dynamic analysis to cover the inherent shortcomings
of static analysis techniques to analyze apps in the presence of dynamic code updates.
Our evaluation results on real world apps demonstrate the effectiveness of StaDART.
However, typically dynamic analysis, and hybrid analysis too for that matter, brings the
problem of stimulating the app’s behavior which is a non-trivial challenge for automated
analysis tools.
To this end, we propose a backward slicing based targeted inter component code
paths execution technique, TeICC. TeICC leverages a backward slicing mechanism to
extract code paths starting from a target point in the app. It makes use of a system
dependency graph to extract code paths that involve inter component communication.
The extracted code paths are then instrumented and executed inside the app context
to capture sensitive dynamic behavior, resolve dynamic code updates and obfuscation.
Our evaluation of TeICC shows that it can be effectively used for targeted execution of
inter component code paths in obfuscated Android apps. Also, still not ruling out the
possibility of adversaries reaching the user devices, we propose an on-phone API hooking
i
based app introspection mechanism, AppIntrospector, that can be used to analyze, detect
and prevent runtime exploitation of app vulnerabilities that involve dynamic code updates.
Keywords: Android Security, Malware Analysis, Dynamic Code Updates
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, technological advancements in every field of life have been observed,
adopted and have now become integral parts of our daily lives. The field of communication
has revolutionized the way man lives and the world has effectively become a global village.
The advent of the Internet in conjunction with modern day smart handheld devices, i.e.,
smartphones and tablets, etc., has brought the world to a user’s fingertips.
Mobile devices are more pervasive and ubiquitous than ever before. Traditional com-
puting has transformed, and rightly so, the number of active mobile devices surpassed
the world population in 2014 [54]. Smartphone vendors, framework providers, and mobile
application developers contribute to this mobile computing ecosystem. With computing
gone mobile, users are empowered to perform office work, undertake banking transactions,
remain active on their social networks, and much more, on the move. As smartphones
provide a wide range of services of varied nature, they access, store, process, send and
receive users’ personal information, which if compromised can harm the user financially,
socially and psychologically. The nature and the sensitivity of the information handled
by a smartphone requires protection from both inside and outside adversarial access.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
Mobile devices are shipped with one of the many operating systems (OS) available; pro-
prietary or open source depending upon the vendor. Typically, vendors allow users to
extend the functionality of their devices by downloading applications (shortly apps) from
various app markets. Although, this feature is more or less common to a varying degree
in all the mobile platforms, in this text we would mainly focus on the Android platform.
Since its introduction in 2008, Android has emerged as the leading operating system
used for handheld devices. Dominating the smartphone market for the last few years, it
reached 86.2% of the smartphone market share in 2016 [97]. During a 30-day active user
1
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monitoring in September 2015, Google confirmed that Android has 1.4 billion active users
globally [50]. Android is an open source operating system with open architecture where
apps are published at numerous third-party market along with its official app market,
i.e., Google Play store [25]. Google Play store surpassed 2.6 million apps in December
2016 [92].
These are some of the stats that provide an idea about the popularity of the Android
framework. The pervasiveness, popularity and capability of mobile devices to collect and
store users’ private and sensitive information makes them very attractive for malware
developers too. Hence, the number of mobile malware samples increases as the days
go by. Among others, here too, Android based devices are in the firing line and recent
reports suggest that 99% of all the mobile malware are targeted towards Android based
devices [60].
To counter mobile malware, app markets deploy different kind of vetting mechanisms,
e.g., Bouncer at the Google Play store. Generally, apps are analyzed before being made
available for the users at the app markets. Apps failing the analysis check are rejected
and Google claimed to have reduced the number of malware by 40% the year immediately
following the introduction of Bouncer [81].
Researchers in both academia and industry contribute to strengthen the analysis pro-
cess and detect malicious apps. Analysis techniques are broadly divided into static and
dynamic analysis, both having their own advantages and disadvantages. As analysis tech-
niques evolve, malware developers also come up with new ways of evading these analysis
tools and infecting user devices. With the passage of time, malicious apps have also
evolved and a variety of evasion techniques, such as anti-emulation, anti-debugging, code
obfuscation, evasive use of dynamic code updates, etc., are being widely used to thwart
analysis tools.
1.1.1 App Analysis in the Presence of Dynamic Code Updates
Mobile app developers use dynamic code updates to extend their apps’ functionality at
runtime. The use of techniques, such as dynamic code loading (DCL) and reflection,
is getting mainstream in mobile apps in the quest to develop feature-rich and adaptive
solutions to meet the needs of providing sophisticated user experiences. On the other
hand, the inherent nature of these techniques makes apps analysis a challenging task, and
therefore, they are often used by malware developers to evade analysis tools deployed at
the app markets.
To make the analysis even more challenging, these techniques are used in conjunction
with other analysis evasion techniques, such as code encryption, parameter encryption and
dynamic provisioning of the parameters used, to name a few. State-of-the-art research
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on static analysis finds it extremely daunting to properly analyze code in the presence
of dynamic code updates [95]. Indeed, the dynamic nature of DCL and reflection do not
allow static analysis tools to properly infer the behavior of an app and, as a result, make
them clueless when detecting malicious functionality.
Moreover, most of the static analysis tools are based on the assumption that the code
base of an app remains the same and does not change dynamically [41,57,74]. Obviously,
this assumption is far from reality and a simplification made to cover the limitations
of the current analysis tools. On the other hand, researchers have demonstrated that
dynamic code updates can be used to bypass the analysis check at app markets [51,90,103].
Nevertheless, a number of static analysis approaches are found in literature to analyze
apps in the presence of dynamic code updates [72, 80, 106] . However, static analysis can
always be hindered with app features of dynamic nature. At the same time, solutions
found in the literature for enhancing static analyzers of Java code to analyze dynamic
code updates rely on loadtime code instrumentation which is not available for Android,
and therefore, these solutions cannot be directly applied to Android apps [48]. Similarly,
solutions based on instrumentation of apps rely on repackaging the app, which breaks the
app signature and allows malicious apps to conceal their malicious functionality.
A research challenge in this regard is to study what makes dynamic code updates so
hard to analyze when only static analysis is used. Moreover, as it can be concluded from
the above discussion that the possibility of dynamic analysis coupled with static analysis
can make the job of an analyst simpler, a challenge would be to design a hybrid approach
that can be deployed to analyze mobile apps in the presence of dynamic code updates.
1.1.2 Ensuring Execution of Targeted Code Paths during Dynamic Analysis
To cover the shortcomings of static analysis and resolve analysis issues created by features
like dynamic code updates, dynamic analysis is often the go-to solution. On the one hand,
dynamic analysis provides solution to these problems. On the other hand, it requires test
cases which could execute a major/required portion of the code which leads to another
challenging problem. Execution of certain code paths in mobile apps depends upon a
combination of various user/system events. Generally, it is hard to predict inputs which
can stimulate the required behavior in these apps. This feature of mobile apps is widely
used by malware developers to conceal malicious functionality.
State-of-the-art research shows a number of triggering solutions, ranging from black-
box to grey-box, for Android apps with a varied degree of code coverage [83,85,94,96,113].
Code coverage is a well-known limitation of dynamic analysis approaches. However, for
the purpose of security analysis rather than testing, it is required to stimulate/reach only
specific points of interest in the code rather than stimulating all the code paths in an
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app. In literature, researchers have focused mainly on providing inputs to make an app
follow a specific path. Providing the exact inputs and environment becomes very hard as
different apps may require different execution environments. Moreover, not all inputs can
be predicted statically, because of obfuscation or other hiding techniques. In addition,
existing target triggering solutions, such as [93] and [43], are generally limited to code
execution inside a signal component of the app or do not handle the dynamic code updates
well.
The key research challenge in this direction is to design an automated and effective
solution for dynamic targeted execution of Android apps. Moreover, the triggering mecha-
nism should also cover inter component communication as it constructs an essential part
of Android apps behavior and analysis would be incomplete without it.
1.2 Research Contributions
The main research aim of this thesis is to move forward the state-of-the-art app analysis
research in the presence of dynamic code updates. Here we briefly discuss the main
research contributions of this work.
1.2.1 Reflection-Bench and Empirical Analysis on Real World Apps
In order to understand what causes the difficulty in analyzing apps in the presence of
dynamic code updates, it is important to perform a study on the manner in which dynamic
code updates are used in real world apps. Moreover, it is essential to have a set of
benchmark apps that could be used by the research community to test the capability of
their static analysis tools to handle dynamic code updates.
• We design and develop reflection-bench, a set of benchmark apps that use reflection
to conceal information leakage, and use it to test some of the state-of-the-art static
analysis tools. We plan to make reflection-bench public so that it can be used by
other researchers to test the effectiveness of their analysis tools in the presence of
reflection.
• We develop an automated static analysis tool which can perform analysis on Android
apps, detect information flow between given source and sink APIs, and produce
statistics about the presence of such information flow paths between source/sink
APIs in individual apps as well as the whole market.
• We collect and analyze a dataset of real world apps containing 16,528 benign and
3,645 malicious apps in order to investigate the sources of the parameters used in
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reflection/DCL APIs. To the best of our knowledge, this is first study focusing on
the sources of the parameters of reflection/DCL APIs. The analysis results would
help in understanding the behavior of apps that use dynamic code updates and
designing more effective analysis procedures and policies to detect malicious apps in
the market.
1.2.2 Handling Dynamic Code Updates using a Combination of Static and
Dynamic analysis
We propose a hybrid approach combining static and dynamic analysis to cover for the
inherent inability of static analysis to deal with dynamic code updates in Android apps.
• We propose, design and implement StaDART, a system that interleaves static and
dynamic analysis in order to reveal the hidden/updated behavior. By utilizing Art-
Droid, we avoid modifications to the Android framework and make it largely frame-
work independent. StaDART downloads and makes available for analysis the code
loaded dynamically, and is able to resolve the targets of reflective calls complement-
ing app’s method call graph with the obtained information. Therefore, StaDART
can be used in conjunction with other static analyzers to make their analysis more
precise.
• We integrate StaDART with DroidBot to make it fully automated and to ease the
evaluation. Moreover, we analyze a dataset of 2,000 real world apps (1,000 benign
and 1,000 malicious). Our analysis results show the effectiveness of StaDART in
revealing behavior which is otherwise hidden to static analysis tools.
• We plan to release our tool as open-source to drive the research on app analysis in
the presence of dynamic code updates.
1.2.3 Triggering Problem: Targeted Execution and Runtime Analysis
One of the main challenges associated with solutions based on dynamic analysis is the
triggering problem, i.e., apps require certain user/system events to follow specific paths. In
this direction, the key research goal is to advance the state-of-the-art research in triggering
mechanisms and design an intelligent and scalable solution for execution of targeted inter
component code paths in Android apps. The main contributions in this regard are enlisted
here.
• We extend the backward slicing mechanism to support inter component communi-
cation (ICC), i.e., extract slices across multiple components. Moreover, we enhance
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a backward slicing tool, SAAF, to perform data flow analysis with context-, path-
and object-sensitivity.
• Targeted execution of the extracted inter-component slices without modification to
the Android framework.
• We design and implement a hybrid analysis system based on static data-flow analysis
and dynamic execution on a real-world device for improved analysis of obfuscated
apps featuring dynamic code updates.
Keeping in mind the severity of the problem and the increasing use of anti-analysis
techniques in recent malware that infiltrated the official Google market, we go a step
ahead and aim to move part of the analysis from the analysis environment to real user
devices. Key contributions in this regard are:
• We introduce a paradigm shift by moving part of the analysis of Android apps from
an artificial analysis environment to end user devices. Careful design, implementa-
tion and deployment of this type of solutions could pave the path to solving problems
like de-obfuscation, triggering and avoiding vulnerability exploitation at runtime.
• We investigate and provide a theoretical overview of some of the well known hooking
tools in security research community and techniques found in the literature.
• We design and implement an app introspection mechanism that leverages API hook-
ing to analyze, detect and prevent malicious activities that involve dynamic code
updates. Our analysis solution relies on minimal collaboration from app develop-
ers and does not require any modification to the Android framework or rooting the
device.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a brief background of Android security. It describes the basics of
dynamic code update techniques and their usage motivations in Android apps. Fur-
thermore, it makes a case of the prevalence of dynamic code updates by presenting
the results of our analysis on the use of dynamic code updates in real world Android
apps, both benign and malicious.
Chapter 3 goes deeper into the problem by presenting an analysis on the manner in
which real world apps use dynamic code updates, i.e., how various dynamic code
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update APIs get their parameters. It also presents a set of benchmark apps and
use them to demonstrate the inability of static analysis tools to analyze apps in the
presence of dynamic code updates.
Chapter 4 provides the design, details of the implementation and evaluation results
of our proposed hybrid solution based on interleaving static and dynamic analysis
techniques to handle dynamic code updates in Android apps.
Chapter 5 presents the design, implementation and evaluation results of our proposed
backward slicing based mechanism for targeted execution of inter component commu-
nication in Android apps. It also discusses the enhancement made to the backward
slicing mechanism and the tool used for backward slicing.
Chapter 6 shifts the analysis from an artificial analysis environment to real user de-
vices. It presents a runtime analysis approach to avoid exploitation of benign, but
vulnerable, apps that involve dynamic code updates. It relies on an API hooking
based app introspection mechanism that analyzes dynamic code updates as they
appear.
Chapter 7 draws the main conclusions of this research work and discusses the possible
future directions.
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Chapter 2
Background
Android is globally accepted as the most widely used operating system for handheld de-
vices. It supports a wide range of devices, such as smartphones, watches, smart TVs,
etc. Android provides an open platform for the developers as well the device manufac-
turers. As a result, device manufactures ship customized variants of Android with their
devices. On the other hand, any third-party developer can develop applications to extend
the Android platform. These apps are usually published to app stores from where users
can download, purchase and install them. This openness of the platform makes it more
attractive for developers and as a result, the number of apps developed for Android based
devices are always on the rise. However, it also attracts adversaries to develop malicious
apps and infect user devices. Hence, the number of malware directed towards Android
based devices is also the highest among other peer platforms.
To counter the problem of malware penetration into the Android ecosystem, Android
incorporates a wide of range of security features. Android security team collaborates
with developers, device manufacturers and researchers to ensure that the best security
practices are followed and the Android platform/apps are free of bugs and vulnerabilities.
The goal of these security features and practices is to stop malware reach a user device
and, in case a malware infects a user device, minimize the damage, i.e., to protect a
user’s private data and resources. Android uses a layered security architecture to counter
malware that targets various levels of the Android stack. In order to protect sensitive
data and resources from malicious apps, Android relies on a Unix-like sandboxing model
and app permissions. Moreover, Android uses an app scanning process at the Google Play
store which blocks apps that can be harmful for user devices.
Despite the robust security architecture of the Android platform, malware developers
still find ways to bypass the scanning process and infect user devices. Hence, Android
ecosystem has malicious apps in abundance. There has been an ongoing competition
between the good and the bad since the day existed and the area of Android security
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is no different. Researchers/developers in both industry and academia propose the best
security practices and tools to avoid being victims of malicious apps. On the other hand,
malware developers use an array of techniques to evade analysis tools and infect user
devices.
2.1 Android Security
An open architecture resulted in Android being the leading OS in smarphone community.
Android is open source where the source code is provided as part of the Android Open
Source Project (AOSP) for developers, researchers and device manufacturers [39]. The
open architecture allows for a repetitive and rigorous research-attack-fix cycle, and as a
result a security hardened framework which is a basic step towards a vigorous Android
ecosystem. We briefly discuss some of the key security features that Android incorporates
to ensure app security.
2.1.1 App Sandboxing
The heart of Android platform is based on a Linux kernel. Over the years, Linux kernel
has been exposed to rigorous research and testing. As a result, it has become secure
and mostly free of bugs. Therefore, it is widely adopted in both academia as well as
industry. Based on the Linux kernel, Android inherits some key security features which
help in running each app in an individual sandbox. The main purpose of app sandboxing
is to prevent harmful apps from damaging other apps on the device as well the Android
framework.
Linux provides a user-based permission model to protect one user’s resources from the
other. Android leverages this user-based permission model to restrict apps to their own
sandboxes. Contrary to Linux, however, Android uses a separate user ID (UID) for each
app. So, each app run as a separate user in a separate process. This in turn creates a
kernel-level sandbox for each app where there are virtual walls between different apps and
the Android framework itself. Each process has its own privileges which determines the
data and resources that can be accessed by this process. Moreover, processes are assigned
group IDs to enforce permissions to access sensitive resources. Consequently, an app can
not access the data of another app or resource unless and until explicitly permitted.
Kernel level sandboxing ensures that apps at all levels, i.e., native apps, user apps and
system apps, abide by the restrictions imposed upon them by the Android framework. The
security model makes sure that, in a properly configured device and without compromising
the Linux kernel level security, a harmful app does not damage any of the other apps on
the device or the device itself.
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2.1.2 Android Permissions
An Android app is delivered to users as an APK file which is a .zip archive containing
multiple code, resources and configuration files. One of these files, AndroidManifest.xml,
determines the app’s capability. It provides information about the various components
of the app, i.e., activities, services, content providers, etc. Listing 2.1 shows an example
Manifest file.
Listing 2.1: Example Manifest File
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf -8"?>
2 <manifest xmlns:android="http: // schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
3 package="com.test" >
4
5 <uses -permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE" />
6 <uses -permission android:name="android.permission.SEND_SMS" />
7
8 <application
9 android:allowBackup="true"
10 android:icon="@drawable/ic_launcher"
11 android:name="com.test.MyApplication"
12 android:label="@string/app_name" >
13 <activity
14 android:name="com.test.MyActivity"
15 ...
16 </activity >
17 </application >
18
19 </manifest >
In the Android sandboxing model, an app is restricted to access limited resources
by default. Access to sensitive resources, which if compromised can adversely affect
the user or device, is generally provided through higher level framework APIs. These
resources are guarded with permissions and an app must declare the required permission
in its Manifest file if it has to access the resource. Android framework defines a list of
permissions corresponding to various sensitive resources, e.g., accessing camera, network,
telephony services, messaging services, etc.
In Listing 2.1, Line 5 and Line 6 represent the declared permissions by the app.
The permission android.permission.SEND SMS guards the SMS sending API. Any app
without this permission cannot send text messages. The list of permissions declared in
the Manifest file of an app are displayed to the user, along with a brief description of what
they are used for, at the time of installation. Before Android 6.0, named Marshmallow,
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Android used an all accept or reject model where a user had to accept all the permissions
in order to proceed with the installation. Starting from Android 6.0, users can selectively
allow and/or deny permissions and install the app. Furthermore, a user can later on
revoke allowed permissions or allow denied permissions. Current permission model makes
app installation more flexible.
Permissions provided by the Android framework are called System permissions. These
permissions are known to app developers and they guard standard framework features
or resources. In addition, developers can define their own permissions to guard some of
the functionality their apps provide to other apps on the device. As a result, only apps
having these user-defined permissions can avail the exported functionality. Based on the
nature of the resources they guard, permissions are divided into various protection levels.
• Normal: Normal permissions are required for apps that require access to data or
resources where a user’s privacy or operation of other apps are not exposed to high
risk. Normal permissions are granted by the system without notifying the user.
• Dangerous: In contrast, dangerous permissions guard data or resources where a
user’s privacy or operation of other apps is at stake. Dangerous permissions are dis-
played to users and only granted to an app after an explicit user approval. Example
of a dangerous permission is android.permission.SEND SMS.
• Signature: Signature level permissions are granted by the system only if the declar-
ing and requesting apps are signed with the same signature.
• SignatureOrSystem: SignatureOrSystem level permissions are granted by the
system to apps which are in the Android system image or in case where declaring
and requesting apps are signed with the same signature. Android documentation
discourages use of permissions with this protection level.
In most of the cases, a SecurityException is raised when an app tries to access data
or resources guarded with a permission that is not granted to the app. Permissions allow
apps to operate within the boundaries explicitly defined by the user. It enables a user to
have control over the app, i.e., revoke permissions or uninstall the app if the app shows
malicious behavior.
2.1.3 App Vetting
Android supports an open app market where anyone can develop apps and publish them
to app stores. There are a number of third-party app stores along with the standard
Google Play store. On the one hand, openness of the app market provides users plenty of
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options to extend the functionality of their Android based devices. On the other hand,
it makes it hard to distinguish between legitimate apps and malicious apps disguised as
benign apps. Hence, the job of security engineers and researchers to maintain a vigorous
Android ecosystem has become more difficult.
At the Google Play store, Android introduced an app scanning mechanism named
Bouncer in 2012. Bouncer is the vetting process Google Play store uses to detect and
block malicious apps. With the introduction of Bouncer, they claimed to have reduced
the number of malware by 40% the following year. Nevertheless, proper vetting process
at most of the Android app stores is close to non-existent. Therefore, these app stores
contribute to a major portion of the malware samples.
The vetting process usually checks apps for malicious contents, looks for suspicious
patterns and observes the behavior of the submitted app before publishing it to the
app store. Two broad categories used for app analysis are static and dynamic analysis,
which analyze the app without and with executing it, respectively. Using such analysis
techniques, Google Play store blocks most of the apps with obvious malicious behavior.
Therefore, incidents of malicious apps being reported at the Google Play store are a minor
portion of all the malware. Higher number of malicious apps found at the third-party app
stores are largely due to the lack of app vetting process at these app stores. To ensure
security and prevent malicious apps at third-party stores infect users’ devices, Android
introduced a new security feature in Android 7.0, i.e., Verify Apps. The verify apps
feature scans apps downloaded from sources other than Google Play before installation.
It also keeps on monitoring the app after installation and warns the user if the app shows
malicious behavior.
As security researchers and engineers strive to develop robust security mechanisms
to ensure a clean Android ecosystem, malware developers come up with more stealthy
ways to go through the security walls and infect user devices. Every new malware sample
reveals that malware developers are well equipped to capitalize on every little security bug
and loophole that might be there in the Android framework or apps. They make use of a
number of evasion techniques which makes it extremely hard for automated analysis tools
to understand the behavior of an app. Some of these techniques include code encryption,
various forms of obfuscation, reflection and dynamic code loading, anti-emulation and
anti-debugging, etc. Since the focus of this dissertation is app analysis in the presence of
reflection and dynamic code loading, we elaborate them more in the following section.
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2.2 Dynamic Class Loading and Reflection in Android
Dynamic code updates play a very important role in modern day feature-rich and dy-
namically changing mobile apps. Here, we provide some background of dynamic class
loading and reflection, their usage and implementation in Android. Android uses An-
droid Runtime (ART) to run apps and system services. ART uses ahead of time (AOT)
compilation using a dex2oat tool to convert DEX files into .oat binaries. However, ART
is backward compatible with its predecessor Dalvik and can execute apps compiled for
the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM). Moreover, the dynamic code update functionality,
i.e., DCL and reflection, is supported by ART as it was supported by the Dalvik runtime.
2.2.1 Overview of Dynamic Class Loading
DCL provides flexibility to a developer to load classes at runtime to extend the function-
ality of apps. Similar to Dalvik, ART allows a developer to load additional code obtained
from alternative locations at runtime [53]. It allows apps to load .zip, .jar and .apk
files containing a valid classes.dex file from outside the app code base, such as files
stored on the internal storage or downloaded from the network.
Android provides a set of class loaders, arranged in a hierarchical manner, which are
used to load classes to memory from internal storage. Every child class loader holds a ref-
erence to its parent class loader where the root of the tree is the BootStrap ClassLoader,
which has a null reference to its parent.
A common interface required by all the class loaders is implemented by an abstract
class named ClassLoader whereas other specific class loaders are then derived from Class-
Loader, such as DexClassLoader, PathClassLoader, etc. ClassLoader provides methods
such as loadClass(), findLoadedCalss() and defineClass(), which allows a devel-
oper to load a class, search for loaded classes and define a class from a byte sequence at
runtime, respectively. Android also provides a class DexFile whose methods can be used
to load classes directly. However, these methods require a reference to a class loader as
an argument.
In case of a class loading request, the current class loader first checks whether the class
has already been loaded or not. If it fails to find the class in the list of the loaded classes,
it requests its parent class loader to find out if the class has already been loaded. This
process continues until the request reaches the root of the tree which tries to find the class.
If the root of the tree is unable to find the requested class, a ClassNotFoundException
is thrown, which propagates back to the initial class loader. This necessarily means that
the class has neither been loaded by the current class loader nor by its parents up till
the root of the class loaders tree. The current class loader then tries to load the class by
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itself. If it fails to load the requested class, the ClassNotFoundException is released.
2.2.2 Overview of Reflection
Reflection is the ability of a program to treat its own code as data and manipulate it
during execution [47]. Using reflection, an app can reason about and modify its execution
state during runtime. The dynamically loaded code is usually accessed using reflection.
Android uses the same reflection APIs as used in Java. In the following, the functionality
provided by reflection APIs is outlined:
• Retrieving Class objects: All of the reflection operations start from java.lang.Class.
Objects of this class represent all the classes and interfaces in a running app.
Classes and interfaces that could be used to obtain reflective information about
other classes and objects are provided by the java.lang.reflect package. Classes
in the java.lang.reflect package are usually without any public constructor.
However, these classes can be instantiated by calling different methods on Class.
Based on the information, an object of Class can be retrieved in different ways. It
is clarified that an instance of Class is referred here as object while an instance
of the corresponding Class object is referred to as ’instance’. If an instance of a
Class object is available, its Class object can be retrieved by calling getClass()
method on the instance. If the type information of an object is available, the corre-
sponding Class object can be retrieved by appending .class to the class type (and
.TYPE for primitive types). A very common way to obtain Class objects, however,
is to call Class.forName(className) where the string className represents the
name of the Class object. Once a Class object is retrieved, other related classes
can also be retrieved using methods such as getSuperClass(), getClasses(),
getDeclaredClasses(), etc.
• Accessing Members: Once a Class object is retrieved, its members can also be
accessed using reflection APIs. These members can be fields, methods or construc-
tors. Field objects can be retrieved using getField(fieldName), where the string
fieldName represents the name of the field, and getDeclaredFields(), which re-
trieves all the declared fields. Similarly, there are APIs to obtain the type information
of fields, and obtain and change field values as well. Having a Class object, Con-
structor objects of this class can be retrieved using the getConstructor(Class[]
params), getConstructors(), or getDeclaredConstructors(). Similarly, Method
objects of a retrieved class can be obtained using methods such as getMethod(methodName,
params), getMethods(), and getDeclaredMethods(), which return objects of the
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specific Method represented by the string methodName, all the public methods of the
class, and all the declared methods in the class, respectively.
• Instance creation and Method Invocation: An instance of a specific class type
can be created if the corresponding object of Class or Constructor is available. A
default zero argument constructor of the class can be called using the newInstance()
method on the Class object whereas the constructor with parameters can be called
using the newInstance(params) method on the Constructor object. Both of these
methods return instances of the given Class object. Similarly, the methods obtained
from the Class objects can be invoked using the invoke(objectRef) method where
the string objectRef represents a reference to the object on which the method is
invoked.
2.2.3 Usage Motivation of Dynamic Class Loading
Dynamic class loading is usually used for the following purposes:
• Extensibility: As shared library does help developers in building modular software,
DCL permits to easily extend the app’s capabilities such that developers can pro-
grammatically get new code running by loading it via different sources (i.e., network,
persistent storage, etc. . . ) at runtime.
• App updates: Instead of distributing updated versions of the same app, function-
ality provided by the current app are extended using updates downloaded through
the network and loaded dynamically using class loaders.
• Common Frameworks: Some of the apps depend upon a common framework.
For example, an advertisement framework, which shows advertisements to the user.
Such a framework is most of the times installed as a separate app and the apps
which rely on it load its code dynamically when needed. If this would not have been
the case, the functionality provided by the framework must have been implemented
in every app dependent upon the framework. Similarly, in the case of updating
that common functionality provided by the framework, only the framework needs to
updated rather than updating all the dependent apps.
2.2.4 Usage Motivation of Reflection
Some of the reflection APIs are discussed in this section earlier. In the following, we
provide an overview of what reflection offers to a developer [106].
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• Hidden API method invocation: Developers of the Android operating system
may mark some methods as hidden. In this case, the declaration of these methods
does not appear in the SDK library and, thus, they are not available for app de-
velopers. At the same time, app developers, who want to use these undocumented
features of Android, may use reflection APIs to invoke them.
• Access to the private API methods and fields: During the compilation, the
compiler ensures that the rules for accessing fields and methods hold according to the
specified modifiers. Unfortunately, using the reflection API at runtime it is possible
to manipulate modifiers and, therefore, gain access to private variables and methods.
• Conversion from JSON and XML representation to Java objects: Reflec-
tion is heavily used in Android to automatically generate JSON and XML represen-
tation from Java objects and vice versa.
• Backward compatibility: It is advised to use reflection to make an app backward
compatible with the previous versions of the Android SDK. In this case, reflection
is exploited either to call the API methods, which have been marked as hidden in
the previous versions of the Android SDK, or to detect if the required SDK classes
and methods are present.
• Plugin and external library support: In order to extend the functionality of
an app, reflection APIs may be used to call plug-ins or external library methods
provided during runtime.
In general, we can conclude that dynamic code loading and reflection are both essential
parts of apps, specifically Android apps. To reinforce the fact further, we provide an
analysis of real world apps on the usage of reflection and DCL in the following section.
2.3 Analysis of Dynamic Code Update Features in Android Apps
To understand the significance of the use of reflection and DCL in Android apps, we
performed a study of 13,863 apps from Google Play store and 14,283 apps from several
third-party markets gathered in July 2013, along with 1260 malware samples from [116].
In this analysis, we consider reflection calls that influence the app method call graph
(MCG), i.e., method invocation (invoke) and object creation (newInstance) functions,
and do not study other reflection API capabilities like field modification.
The aggregated results of the analysis with our modified version1 of AndroGuard [2]
1We found out that AndroGuard does not discover all possible cases of reflection and DCL.
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Table 2.1: Usage of DCL and Reflection in Applications
Markets
Total DCL used by Refl. used by
Apps Apps % Apps %
Google Play 13863 2573 18.5% 12233 88.2%
Androidbest 1655 35 2.1% 1088 65.7%
Androiddrawer 2677 379 14.1% 2596 96.9%
Androidlife 1677 117 6.9% 1368 81.5%
Anruan 4230 162 3.8% 2868 67.8%
Appsapk 2664 112 4.2% 1907 71.5%
F-droid 1380 11 0.07% 792 52.8%
Malware 1260 251 19.9% 1025 81.3%
Total 29406 3640 12.3% 23877 81.1%
are shown in Table 2.1. It is evident that dynamic code update features are widely used
by application developers.
On Google Play we downloaded approximately 500 top free applications from each
category. Results of the analysis reveal that on average 18.5% of analyzed apps from
Google Play contain DCL and 88% use reflection. On average, apps with DCL contain 1
DCL call and apps with reflection incorporate around 22 reflective calls. The categories
“BUSINESS”, “SHOPPING” and “TRAVEL AND LOCAL” show minimal DCL rates
(at most 10% of apps use DCL). The most “dynamic” category is “GAME”; 38.3% of
applications in this category use DCL2.
We further downloaded apps from 6 third-party markets, namely, androidbest [5],
androiddrawer [6], androidlife [7], anruan [9], appsapk [10] and f-droid [21]. The first
5 markets distribute only provided APK files, while the latter (f-droid) along with the
final packages also provides links to the source code of the apps. The lowest fraction
of applications with DCL calls were observed on the f-droid market that contains only
open-source apps. In terms of individual usage, the average number of reflection calls is
around 19 per app package across all third-party markets (with f-droid exhibiting again
the lowest number of reflection calls at around 14).
Besides the analysis of benign applications, we studied malware samples provided
in [116]. The average usage of DCL across all malware samples is 19.9%, whereas 81%
of all samples use reflection. However, this dataset is old, and DCL usage rates in more
recent malicious applications are expected to be significantly higher [90] because this
2Mobile games can be very sophisticated and include realistic physics and a lot of graphics. Thus, developers
often develop the original app as an installer that dynamically fetches additional code during the first run.
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functionality is used to conceal malicious payloads [64] from static and dynamic analyzers
like Google Bouncer.
Listing 2.2: DCL and Reflection Usage in AnserverBot
1 [com.sec.android.providers.drm.Doctype]
2 public static Object b(File pFile , String pStr1 , String pStr2 , Object []
pArrOfObj) {
3 String s3;
4 if (pFile == null) {
5 String s1 = a.getFilesDir ().getAbsolutePath ();
6 //get the name of the file to be loaded
7 //9CkOrC32uI327WBD7n__ -> /anserverb.db
8 String s2 = Xmlns.d("9CkOrC32uI327WBD7n__");
9 s3 = s1.concat(s2);
10 }
11 for (File locFile = new File(s3); ;locFile = pFile) {
12 String s4 = locFile.getAbsolutePath ();
13 String s5 = a.getFilesDir ().getAbsolutePath ();
14 ClassLoader locClassLoader = a.getClassLoader ().getParent ();
15 //get the class specified by "pStr1" from anserverb.db
16 Class locCls = new DexClassLoader(s4 , s5 , null , locClassLoader).loadClass(
pStr1);
17 Class[] arrOfCls = new Class [5];
18 arrOfCls [0] = Context.class;
19 arrOfCls [1] = Intent.class;
20 arrOfCls [2] = BroadcastReceiver.class;
21 arrOfCls [3] = FileDescriptor.class;
22 arrOfCls [4] = String.class;
23 //get the method specified by "pStr2"
24 Method locMtd = locCls.getMethod(pStr2 , arrOfCls);
25 // create new instance of the class
26 Object locObj = locCls.newInstance ();
27 // invoke the method through reflection
28 return locMtd.invoke(locObj , pArrOfObj);
29 }
30 }
Example Malware: Listing 2.2 is a code snippet of the AnserverBot Trojan [115],
which illustrates how reflection and DCL are used to thwart static analyzers from detection
of malicious functionality. Line 16 shows an example of a dynamic class loading call in
Android using the DexClassLoader class. The name of the file from which the code is
loaded is computed at runtime in Line 8. Line 26 exhibits how to create an object of
the loaded class using a reflective call to the default constructor. Line 28 demonstrates
a method invocation through reflection; the name of the invoked method is passed as a
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parameter and, thus, may not be available for static analysis.
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided a brief background on how security engineers and researchers strive
to ensure a clean Android ecosystem. We discussed the basics of Android security archi-
tecture and some of the techniques used by malware developers to evade security checks.
An introduction to dynamic code updates and an analysis on its usage in real world apps
is provided at the latter part of the chapter. The results of our analysis reveal that
the dynamic code updates are used widely in both legitimate as well as malicious apps,
however, their usage in malicious apps is on the higher side.
Chapter 3
Bypassing Analysis tools Using
Dynamic Code Updates
Dynamic code update techniques, such as reflection and dynamic class loading, enable
apps to change their behavior at runtime. These techniques are heavily used in Android
apps for extensibility. However, malware developers misuse these techniques to conceal
malicious functionality, bypass static analysis tools and expose the malicious functionality
only when the app is installed and run on a user’s device. Although, the use of these tech-
niques alone may not be sufficient to bypass analysis tools, it is the use of reflection/DCL
APIs with obfuscated parameters that makes the state-of-the-art static analysis tools for
Android unable to infer the correct behavior of the app. This chapter demonstrates this
fact further by testing some of the state-of-the-art static analysis tools with Reflection-
Bench, our suite of benchmark test applications that use reflection in various ways to
perform malicious activities. Moreover, using a test malware app, InboxArchiver, that is
based on dynamic code loading to conceal malicious functionality, we demonstrate how
dynamic code loading can be used to evade online analysis systems.
To understand the current trends in real apps, it is important to perform a study on
the sources of the parameters used in reflection/DCL APIs. In this chapter, we describe
how malicious apps bypass analysis tools using reflection/DCL with parameters provided
by sources, such as network, files, encrypted strings, etc., which are hard to analyze
statically. We further develop a tool to analyze a dataset of 3,645 real world malware
samples and 16,528 benign apps in order to investigate the sources of the parameters
used in reflection/DCL APIs. The results of our analysis indicate the presence of such
programming practices in both legitimate and malicious apps. However, malicious apps
tend to obfuscate the parameters of reflection/DCL APIs more often. The use of Crypto
related APIs as sources of the parameters of reflection/DCL APIs is significantly higher in
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malicious apps, which endorses the fact that malicious apps try to thwart static analysis
tools.
3.1 Introduction
Malware developers use an array of techniques to evade analysis tools deployed by app
markets and execute malicious code on users’ devices. Code obfuscation, anti-debugging,
emulator detection, time bombs, reflection and DCL are some of the techniques found
in modern mobile malware. In this dissertation, we are particularly interested in the
latter two techniques. Reflection and DCL enable development of flexible apps which can
change their behavior at runtime after being installed on a user’s device. The same feature
serves well for malware developers as they develop seemingly benign apps at installation
time that can load additional malicious code at runtime using DCL and access it using
reflection APIs. Doing so, they evade static analysis tools that rely on the availability
of all the information before the analysis starts. Reflection/DCL APIs operate on string
parameters representing code files, classes, methods, etc. When these parameters are
not readily available in the code at analysis time (i. e., encrypted and only decrypted
at runtime, read from a file provided via network), state-of-the-art static analysis tools
find it impossible to infer the exact behavior of the app. Therefore, the sources of these
parameters become much more important from security point of view as they play a
vital role in malicious usage of reflection/DCL APIs. While previous works use various
techniques to analyze apps in the presence of dynamic code updates, this dimension of
reflection/DCL is most often overlooked [80] [106] [110].
In order to further describe the problem, this chapter demonstrates the lack of effec-
tiveness of the state-of-the-art tools when it comes to analysing apps that hide suspicious
behavior using reflection and dynamic code loading. We develop a set of benchmark
apps that use reflection in different ways to conceal information leakage. Our analy-
sis of reflection-bench using some of the state-of-the-art static analysis tools shows their
ineffectiveness to handle apps that use reflection. We plan to make reflection-bench pub-
lic to enable researchers to test their analysis tools with it. Furthermore, we develop
InboxArchiver, a seemingly benign app that uses dynamic code loading to hide its suspi-
cious functionality, and use it to test some of the most well known online analysis systems.
The analysis reports show that InboxArchiver easily bypasses these analysis systems.
Moreover, we analyze the sources of the parameters of reflection/DCL APIs in real
world apps that allow them to conceal malicious behavior and evade static analysis tools.
We develop a tool, based on SAAF [74], to track information flow to reflection and DCL
APIs. It uses backward program slicing to determine the sources of the parameters used in
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reflection/DCL APIs. The tool takes an Android APK file (or a directory containing APK
files), performs analysis on it and generates statistics about the usage of reflection/DCL
APIs and the corresponding sources of their parameters. The results of our analysis on
real world apps show that it is more common in malicious apps to take parameters of
reflection/DCL APIs from sources, such as Crypto related APIs, which help thwart static
analysis.
Contributions:
• We design and develop reflection-bench, a set of benchmark apps that use reflection
to conceal information leakage, and use it to test some of the state-of-the-art static
analysis tools. We plan to make reflection-bench public so that it can be used by
other researchers to test the effectiveness of their analysis tools in the presence of
reflection.
• We develop an automated static analysis tool which can perform analysis on Android
apps, detect information flow between given source and sink APIs, and produce
statistics about the presence of such information flow paths between source/sink
APIs in individual apps as well as the whole market.
• We collect and analyze a dataset of real world apps containing 16,528 benign and
3,645 malicious apps in order to investigate the sources of the parameters used in
reflection/DCL APIs. To the best of our knowledge, this is first study focusing on
the sources of the parameters of reflection/DCL APIs. The analysis results would
help in understanding the behavior of apps that use dynamic code updates and
designing more effective analysis procedures and policies to detect malicious apps in
the market.
3.2 Motivating Examples
Evidence of obfuscated parameters of reflection/DCL APIs used in real world malware
motivates this part of the work. To explain it further, we consider three concrete samples
of mobile malware: BrainTest, Fakenotify and AnserverBot [61,91,115]. In BrainTest, the
strings representing the code files to be downloaded, classes to be instantiated and meth-
ods to be invoked using reflection/DCL APIs are provided through a file downloaded from
the Internet at runtime; in Fakenotify, the strings representing the classes to be instanti-
ated and methods to be invoked are provided as encrypted strings and only decrypted at
runtime; and AnserverBot is a malware family where strings representing code files to be
loaded are provided as encrypted strings.
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BrainTest: Check Point Mobile Threat Prevention detected an Android malware in
August 2015, which is packaged inside a game app known as BrainTest and has 100,000-
500,000 downloads at Google Play Store. As reported, the malware infected up to 1
million users.
The malware uses a number of techniques to bypass Google Bouncer. It conceals its
malicious activity if the IP or domain in which the app is being executed is mapped to
Google Bouncer. It uses a combination of time bombs, dynamic code loading, reflection,
encrypted code files, and malicious code (root exploits) downloaded from the Internet, to
harden reverse engineering and evade analysis tools.
Once the app is installed on a user’s device, it decrypts an encrypted file start.ogg
from the app’s assets directory and loads it using DexClassLoader. The dynamically
loaded file starts communicating with a Command&Control (C&C) server. The server
responds with a .json file that contains a link to a .jar file which the app downloads
and dynamically loads using DexClassLoader. In addition, the .json file also contains
names of the classes and methods which are to be invoked by the app using reflection
APIs. The malware then drops root exploits and installs/uninstalls other APKs as the
C&C server directs.
Listing 3.1: FakenotifyA - SMS Trojan
1 SmsManager localSmsManager = SmsManager.getDefault ();
2 String str2 = paramString1;
3 String str3 = paramString2;
4 localSmsManager.sendTextMessage(str2 , null , str3 , null , null);
Fakenotify: It is noticed that Android malware evolves to harden analysis and reverse
engineering. Listing 3.1 shows an excerpt from an SMS trojan named FakenotifyA [61].
The Listing shows how FakenotifyA uses a standard SMS sending procedure to send
messages to premium numbers. Although, the message, paramString2, and the number,
paramString1, to which the message is sent are provided at runtime, the SMS sending
mechanism is pretty obvious and easy to detect for the analysis tools.
After some time, a new version of the same malware, FakenotifyB, surfaced. Fakeno-
tifyB is exactly similar to FakenotifyA when it comes to its malicious functionality,
however, FakenotifyB makes use of reflection to dynamically create an instance of the
SMSManager class, retrieves objects of its getDefault and sendTextMessage methods
and invokes them. In addition to using reflection, the parameters representing the names
of SMSManager class and its methods are provided in encrypted form and only decrypted
at runtime. The SMS sending routine is shown in Listing 3.2 and it is much harder for
analysis tools to infer its behavior unlike FakenotifyA [61].
AnserverBot: The presence of such evasive usage of reflection/DCL APIs is not an
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Listing 3.2: FakenotifyB - Version 2 of FakenotifyA
1 Class class1 = Class.forName(StringDecoder.decode("&nd}D%d.(!x!ejDn5.SmsM&n&g!}"
));
2 Object obj = class1.getMethod(StringDecoder.decode("g!(?!f&wx("), new Class [0]).
invoke(null , new Object [0]);
3 class1.getMethod(StringDecoder.decode("s!ndz !4(M!ss&g!"), new Class [] {java/lang
/String , java/lang/String , java/lang/String , android/app/PendingIntent ,
android/app/PendingIntent }).invoke(obj , new Object [] {s, null , s1, null ,
null});
isolated incident in the Android malware. There are many examples where whole malware
families rely on loading code dynamically and using encrypted strings in reflection/DCL
APIs to evade detection by analysis tools. Listing 3.3 shows a piece of code taken from a
sample of the AnserverBot family. It uses an encrypted string (9CkOrC32uI327WBD7n )
to hold the file name which is then decrypted (str2) at runtime and concatenated with
another string (str1) to get the file name (str3). The absolute path is then retrieved in
str4 and provided to DexClassLoader to load the file dynamically.
Listing 3.3: Excerpt from AnserverBot
1 //9CkOrC32uI327WBD7n__ -> /anserverb.db
2 String str2 = Xmlns.d("9CkOrC32uI327WBD7n__");
3 str3 = str1.concat(str2);
4 for (File localFile = new File(str3); ; localFile = paramFile){
5 String str4 = localFile.getAbsolutePath ();
6 String str5 = a.getFilesDir ().getAbsolutePath ();
7 ClassLoader localClassLoader = a.getClassLoader ().getParent ();
8 //get the class specified by "paramString1" from anserverb.db
9 Class localClass = new DexClassLoader(str4 , str5 , null , localClassLoader).
loadClass(paramString1);
The point worth noticing in these three examples is the use of parameters in reflec-
tion/DCL APIs that are not readily available for the analysis tools. Consequently, static
analysis tools find it impossible to construct the exact behavior of these apps. Therefore,
the focus of the analysis in this chapter is not only reflection/DCL APIs, but also the
manner in which the parameters are provided to these APIs.
3.3 Reflection-Bench and InboxArchiver
This section demonstrates how malware developers can evade static analysis tools and the
available online analysis systems using dynamic code updates. Both the cases, reflection
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and DCL, are discussed separately. In the first subsection, we discuss Reflection-Bench
(our benchmark of Android applications to test static analysis for reflection resolution),
whereas in the second subsection, we discuss our sample test malware, InboxArchiver,
which makes use of dynamic code loading to evade current available online analysis sys-
tems.
3.3.1 Reflection-Bench
Reflection is a very useful and heavily used dynamic code update technique in ever chang-
ing Android apps. However, it comes with an inherent ability to harden static analysis of
apps which makes it attractive for malware developers. Although, researchers have worked
on trying to resolve reflection in Android apps, there has not been a benchmark of apps
which could be used as a test suite for reflection in Android. We present Reflection-Bench,
a set of Android apps, which use reflection to conceal information leakage so that it cannot
be detected by static anlyzers. We use Reflection-Bench to test some of the very recent
state-of-the-art static analysis tools.
Overview: The purpose of developing Reflection-Bench is to provide a set of Android
based applications which could be used by analysis tools to test their capabilities in
resolving reflection. These apps use reflection in various forms to conceal information
leakage and make the flow of the program ambiguous. We have developed a set of 14
apps based on how reflection is used and how the reflection APIs get their arguments.
Before describing the apps in Reflection-Bench, we go through the different cases of
reflection that this benchmark covers. We divide the apps into different categories and
try to make detection harder as we move from one case to the other. The hardness of
reflection resolution depends upon the nature of the arguments used in the reflection
APIs. We can broadly categorize their nature into static strings and dynamic strings. By
static strings, we intend to refer to those string arguments which are provided as part of
the application package, e.g., strings defined inside the program, read from a file which is
part of the application, etc.
In Reflection-Bench, we do not consider the case of dynamic strings/arguments, e.g,
those received over the network, read from files on disk, received from other apps, etc. The
case of such dynamic strings makes it almost impossible for static analysis tools to resolve
reflection. We focus on those cases where all the information regarding the arguments of
the reflection APIs are provided as part of the application. However, with each case the
complexity is gradually increased.
In the first few cases, the arguments of reflection APIs are constant strings assigned
to program variables. In the latter cases, we consider reading the arguments from a
properties file (part of the APK file) and from a hashtable defined inside the program.
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Moreover, we also consider the cases where the string arguments are formed from the
concatenation of multiple strings or decrypted from encrypted strings using crypto APIs.
In addition, we consider two levels of complexity where in level one, reflection is used to
call only the methods defined inside the app and in level two, both the methods defined
inside the program as well as the senstive APIs, which are responsible for leaking sensitive
information, are called through reflection.
Reflection-Bench is designed so that it can be used to test tools which perform taint
analysis as well as those which only generate call graphs for other forms of static analysis.
Implementation: We have two major classes in most of the cases, i.e, BaseClass and
MainActivity. BaseClass has two methods, where Method1 gets the device ID using the
getDeviceID API and stores it in a local field Str. Method2 gets a string and sends it
out using the sendTextMessage() API.
MainActivity calls Method1() of BaseClass, gets its field Str and sends it to the
Method2 of BaseClass which leaks it out.
We tried to cover different combinations of reflection APIs which could make it hard
for static analyzers to detect the information leakage. In the following, we describe how
reflection APIs are used in each case.
• 1 MainActivity retrieves the the field Str of BaseClass using getField() reflection
API.
• 2 MainActivity retrieves an instance of BaseClass using the reflection API forName(),
creates its object using the newInstance() API and gets its field Str using the
getField() reflection API.
• 3 MainActivity retrieves an instance of BaseClass using the reflection API forName(),
gets its Constructor using the getConstructor API, creates its object using the
newInstance() API and gets its field Str using the getField() reflection API.
• 4 MainActivity retrieves an instance of BaseClass using the reflection API forName(),
creates its object using the newInstance() API and gets its field Str using the
getField() reflection API. It also retrieves the methods of BaseClass using the
getMethod() reflection API and calls them using the invoke() reflection API.
• 5 MainActivity retrieves an instance of BaseClass using the reflection API forName(),
gets its Constructor using the getConstructor API, creates its object using the
newInstance() API and gets its field Str using the getField() reflection API. It
also retrieves the methods of BaseClass using the getMethod() reflection API and
call them using the invoke() reflection API.
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In the above cases, the names of the class ”BaseClass”, its methods and its field
are provided as static strings in the MainActivity class. In the following, we try to
acquire/generate these names at runtime in addition to Case 4 .
• 6 Reads the names of BaseClass, its methods and its field from a file.
• 7 Reads the names of BaseClass, its methods and its field from a Hashtable.
• 8 Constructs the names of BaseClass, its methods and its field from multiple strings
in the program.
• 9 Decrypts the encrypted names of BaseClass, its methods and its field using
Crypto APIs.
In all of the above cases, reflection APIs are only used in MainActivity and the
sensitive APIs, i.e., getDeviceId() and sendTextMessage(), are called directly
in BaseClass. In the following cases, we introduce reflection in BaseClass too in
addition to Case 4 .
• 10 BaseClass retrieves an instance of the TelephonyManager class using the reflec-
tion API forName(), creates its object using the newInstance() API, gets the sen-
sitive APIs using the getMethod() reflection API and calls them using the invoke()
reflection API.
In the above case, we use static strings for the names of the class TelephonyManager
and the methods getDeviceId() and sendTextMessage(). In the following we
acquire/generate these names at runtime in addition to Case 10 .
• 11 Reads the names of TelephonyManager class, methods getDeviceId() and
sendTextMessage() from a file.
• 12 Reads the names of TelephonyManager class, methods getDeviceId() and
sendTextMessage() from a Hashtable.
• 13 Constructs the names of TelephonyManager class, methods getDeviceId() and
sendTextMessage() from multiple strings inside the app.
• 14 Decrypts the encrypted names of TelephonyManager class, methods getDeviceId()
and sendTextMessage() using Crypto APIs.
Tools analysis results: We report the results of analysis on recent state-of-the-art
tools, e.g., Flowdroid [41], Androguard [2], Amandroid [104], SAAF [74], SCandroid [66]
and IccTa [78].
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Table 3.1: Analysis with State-of-the-art tools
Apps
Taint Analysis Call Graphs
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DataFlow1 7 7 7 - NA NA
PlainStringsL1-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
PlainStringsL1-2 7 7 7 - 7 3
PlainStringsL1-3 7 7 7 - 7 3
PlainStringsL1-4 7 7 7 - 7 3
FileStringsL1-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
HashtableStringsL1-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
MultipleStringsL1-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
EncryptedStringsL1-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
PlainStringsL2-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
FileStringsL2-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
HashtableStringsL2-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
MultipleStringsL2-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
EncryptedStringsL2-1 7 7 7 - 7 7
A summary of the results is provided in Table 3.1. Those tools which perform taint
analysis, such as Amandroid, etc., are analyzed by performing taint analysis of the apps
in Reflection-Bench. However, for those tools which do not perform taint analysis, such
as Androguard, etc., we analyze them by generating call graphs of the apps using these
tools. In Table 3.1, a 3 in column X, indicates that the app is successfully analyzed by
tool X, whereas, a 7 in the same column indicates otherwise.
• Amandroid, Flowdroid, IccTa and SCandroid
To analyze Reflection-Bench with Amandroid, Flowdroid, IccTa and SCandroid, we
performed taint analysis of the apps using these tools. These tools analyze APK
files and report the presence of sources/sinks of information as well as the tainted
paths between these sources and sinks, if any.
As shown in Table 3.1, in the analysis of Reflection-Bench with Flowdroid, Flowdroid
did not report any information leakage in any of the apps as represented by 7 in the
Flowdroid column. Although, it did report the presence of sources and sinks in some
of the apps. Similar is the case with Amandroid and IccTa too. None of these tools
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could detect the information flows obfuscated using reflection in Reflection-Bench.
With IccTa, it is understandably so, because it relies on Flowdroid for information
flow analysis. For SCanDroid, we could not get any meaningful results as all the
experiments ended with an error. We also could not get any help to fix it as the tool
is not well supported.
• Androguard and SAAF
Since Androguard and SAAF are not taint analysis tools and only generate method
call graphs of apps, we analyze Reflection-Bench with these tools by generating the
MCGs of the apps. In each of the generated MCGs, we look for the app’s methods
and APIs called through reflection.
The first application of Reflection-Bench is only for those tools which perform taint
analysis. It only uses reflection to make the data-flow ambiguous. The rest of the
apps can be used to test both kinds of apps, those which only generate MCGs and
those which perform taint analysis too. As shown in Table 3.1, Androguard does
not correctly identify any method called through reflection in any of the 13 apps.
SAAF’s results are relatively better than Androguard’s results. As column ’SAAF’
shows, SAAF is able to correctly identify the targets of reflection calls in four of the
applications in Reflection-Bench. In these four apps, the arguments provided to the
reflection APIs are plain strings. SAAF does not resolve the targets in other cases
where the arguments are either read from a file or hashtable, encrypted strings and
formed from multiple strings inside the apps. It is important to remember here that
none of the applications get any arguments from outside the application.
These analysis results show that with a bit of tweaking using reflection, static analysis
tools find it extremely hard to properly analyze apps.
3.3.2 InboxArchiver: Test Malware using DCL
App developers use dynamic code loading for various legitimate purposes, mainly extend-
ing the functionality of the app. However, this feature can be used by malware developers
to bypass analysis tools deployed at the app markets. A malware developer can submit
a seemingly benign app with hidden malicious functionality, i.e., obfuscated functionality
to load additional code provided once the app is installed on a user’s device. We demon-
strate with our InboxArchiver app how a malware developer can bypass analysis tools
using DCL.
Overview: InboxArchiver is a simple app that reads the SMS inbox and sends some
statistics to a number provided by the user. These statistics include the number of SMS
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messages sent to and received from certain numbers. A user can configure InboxArchiver
to receive a daily, weekly or monthly SMS message containing these statistics.
Figure 3.1: InboxArchiver - Screenshot
The malicious part of the app, however, downloads some additional code from the
Internet which contains other numbers potentially owned by an adversary, loads this code
using the DCL APIs and leaks these SMS inbox statistics.
Implementation: The main features of InobxArchiver are the use of DCL and re-
flection having encrypted strings representing the code paths, class names and method
names. This helps InboxArchiver evade static analysis tools. In order to evade dynamic
analysis, it makes use of a simple delay technique where again the APIs are called using
reflection with encrypted parameters. Although there are other more sophisticated tech-
niques available, the use of a mere delay technique signifies the role of DCL/reflection in
evading analysis tools.
InboxArchiver consists of three main classes, i.e., a MainActivity class, a MessageSender
class and a Loader class. The MainActivity class presents an interface to the user as
shown in Figure 3.1. The MessageSender class, which is a Service and runs in the back-
ground, is responsible for retrieving the inbox statistics and sending it periodically to a
pre-configured number. After a certain delay, the MessageSender class instantiates an
object of the Loader class which handles the downloading of additional code from the In-
ternet and dynamically loading it using DCL APIs. It makes use of encrypted parameters
and encryption/decryption functionality provided by other auxiliary classes.
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Table 3.2: InboxArchiver Analysis using Online Analysis Systems
Analysis System Analyzed Obfuscation DCL Malware
VirusTotal [35] 3 7 7 7
UnDroid [13] 3 3 7 7
AndroTotal [8] 3 7 7 7
ds-andrototal [30] 3 7 7 7
MobiSec Lab [28] 3 7 7 7
CopperDroid [102] Queued - - -
SandDroid [32] 3 3 3 7
Analysis results: We uploaded InboxArchiver to a number of online Android app
analysis systems. Table 3.2 shows a summary of the results from the online analysis
systems. Column Analyzed shows whether the app is properly analyzed or not. The next
two columns, Obfuscation and DCL, show if the analysis systems detect obfuscation and
the use of dynamic code loading, respectively. The last column in the table represents
the final remarks about the app.
Among the online analysis tools shown in Table 3.2, we did not receive any results
from CopperDroid and the app is still in the queue for more than a year now. All other
tools were unable to detect that the submitted app is malicious. VirusTotal scanned the
app with 54 antivirus tools, including BitDefender [15], GData [24], AVG [14], Avast [12]
and Kaspersky [26], etc., and none of them labeled it suspicious. UnDroid and SandDroid
termed the app as obfuscated, while SandDroid could also detect dynamic code loading
in the app. However, it could not detect the loaded file and analyze it.
3.4 Analysis Tool: Design and Implementation
The architecture and workflow of the analysis tool is shown in Figure 3.2. It is composed
of two main modules represented by the dotted rectangles, i. e., a slice extraction module
and a slice analysis module.
Slice Extraction: Most android app analysis tools transform Android’s Dalvik byte-
code to Java bytecode or source code in order to use the already available tools for Java
program analysis. However, the translation from Dalvik bytecode to Java source code can-
not always be accurate, specifically in apps that use some obfuscation techniques [101].
We perform analysis on disassembled Dalvik bytecode, i. e., smali code, which does not
suffer from this limitation.
The slice extraction module takes an APK file or a directory, where APK files are
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Figure 3.2: Analysis Tool Design
located, and a list of target APIs as input. A target API along with its specific parameter
is the starting point of the analysis. The Backward Slicer searches for all the occurrences
of the target API in the app’s smali code after disassembling the APK file and backtracks
them. The backtracking process starts with the register that stores the value of the
parameter used in the target API and tracks backward in the code to find all other registers
that have a direct or indirect effect on the value of this register. Consequently, the analysis
tool captures the information flow to the target API. The set of code statements involved
in the information flow to a target API is called a Backward Slice. The Backward Slicer is
based on SAAF which can perform backward program slicing on smali code [74]. However,
original SAAF does not consider the information flow performed through Android Intents
and may miss some information flows. Intents are messaging objects used for inter-
component and inter-app communication. Typically, they are used to start activities,
services or invoke broadcast receivers. In order to extend this functionality, we modified
SAAF to track information flow performed through explicit Android Intents. The Slice
Extractor extracts all the code instructions that form a particular slice, marked by the
Backward Slicer, in the form of a .csv file. Listing 3.4 shows an example of a code slice
for the method forName of the class Ljava/lang/Class;. Once the slices are extracted,
the analysis process moves to the next module, i. e., slice analysis.
Slice Analysis: The next step in the analysis is to detect information flow from a
source API to the target API. This module takes the slice files generated in the previous
step and a list of source APIs as input. It consists of a set of Python scripts, which we call
Slice Analyzer, collectively. The Slice Analyzer traverses through each code instruction in
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Listing 3.4: Backward Code Slice. TargetLine: 63, TargetClass: Ljava/lang/Class;, Target-
Method: forName
1 34: invoke -virtual {p0}, Ldisi/test/app/MainActivity;->getResources () Landroid/
content/res/Resources;
2 36: move -result -object v12
3 38: const/high16 v13 , 0x7f05
4 40: invoke -virtual {v12 , v13}, Landroid/content/res/Resources;->openRawResource(
I)Ljava/io/InputStream;
5 42: move -result -object v10
6 46: new -instance v9 , Ljava/util/Properties;
7 48: invoke -direct {v9}, Ljava/util/Properties;-><init >()V
8 52: invoke -virtual {v9 , v10}, Ljava/util/Properties;->load(Ljava/io/InputStream
;)V
9 55: const -string v12 , "class"
10 57: invoke -virtual {v9 , v12}, Ljava/util/Properties;->getProperty(Ljava/lang/
String ;) Ljava/lang/String;
11 59: move -result -object v1
12 63: invoke -static {v1}, Ljava/lang/Class;->forName(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang
/Class;
the slices corresponding to the target APIs and locates the presence of source APIs. The
purpose of such traversal is to infer a source/sink relationship between the source and
the target APIs. The Slice Analyzer not only reveals such source/sink relationships, but
also provides statistics regarding the number of apps containing the target/source APIs,
occurrences of the target/source APIs and their relationship in each individual app and
in all the analyzed apps in a market. A report containing these statistics is generated in
the form of a .json file.
3.5 Application Analysis
We analyze a dataset of apps for potential dangerous usage of reflection/DCL APIs.
Potential dangerous usage refers to the usage of reflection/DCL APIs in conjunction with
certain sources of their parameters that complicate the overall analysis and might be used
by malware developers to evade static analysis tools. There are two distinct entities in
this analysis, i. e., 1) reflection/DCL APIs, 2) source APIs. The purpose of the analysis
is to infer the presence of information flow from the source APIs to certain parameters
of reflection/DCL APIs. In this section, we describe the target reflection/DCL APIs, the
corresponding source APIs of their parameters and the apps dataset.
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3.5.1 API Selection
Reflection and DCL APIs: Table 3.3 contains a representative list of DCL and reflec-
tion APIs that are tracked for analysis and considered as the target APIs. The first two
columns represent the class and method names, whereas the last column represents the
specific parameters of interest in these API calls. The APIs are divided into three cate-
gories. The first category, Dynamic Code Loading, contains APIs that are used to load
code in the form of .jar/.apk/.dex files at runtime. APIs in the second category, Class
Retrieval, are used to load classes and create their objects. The last category, Method
Retrieval and Invocation, contains APIs that are used to retrieve method objects and
invoke them.
We have included only those APIs which can potentially help conceal malicious be-
havior and they require essential parameters when using either DCL or reflection. For
instance, loadDex method of the class Ldalvik/system/DexFile is tracked for its first
parameter, sourcePathName, which is of type String and represents the path to the
.jar/.apk/.dex file to be loaded. A malware developer can obfuscate the parameter
provided to the loadDex method and make it hard for analysis tools to determine the
location of the code which is loaded dynamically. Similar is the case with the construc-
tors of PathClassLoader and DexClassLoader. Obfuscation of the parameters of these
class constructors makes it hard for analysis tools to infer the location of the dynamically
loaded code. Here, libraryPath, represents the path to the directory containing native
libraries.
Moreover, static analysis can be led to unsound results through the use of obfuscated
parameters passed to the loadClass method of the Ljava/lang/ClassLoader class or
the forName method of the Ljava/lang/Class class. In both cases, static analysis tools
will be unable to know the exact class which is to be loaded at runtime. Using obfuscated
parameters in methods, such as getDeclaredMethod, getMethod and invoke, can leave
the analysis tool clueless about the methods being retrieved or called. So, even if the
location of the code and class to be loaded is known, the behavior of the app can not
be completely determined as static analysis can not correctly identify the method or the
order in which the methods are being called, which is pivotal to understanding an app’s
behavior.
Source APIs: Hard coded strings inside the code are easy to analyze for static anal-
ysis tools even if they are used as parameters to reflection/DCL APIs. However, when
these strings are not readily available inside the code, static analysis tools are completely
ineffective in inferring an app’s behavior. To evade static analysis tools, the string pa-
rameters to reflection/DCL APIs can be retrieved from various sources at runtime. Table
3.4 provides a list of APIs that are used to access such sources. The sources are chosen
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Table 3.3: The List of Tracked APIs and Their Parameters
Class Method ParamNo Params
Dynamic Code Loading
Ldalvik/system/PathClassLoader; <init> 1,2 dexPath, libraryPath
Ldalvik/system/DexClassLoader <init> 1,3 dexPath, libraryPath
Ldalvik/system/DexFile; loadDex 1 sourcePathName
Class Retrieval
Ljava/lang/ClassLoader; loadClass 1 className
Ljava/lang/Class; forName 1 className
Method Retrieval and Invocation
Ljava/lang/Class; getDeclaredMethod 1 methodName
Ljava/lang/Class; getMethod 1 methodName
Ljava/lang/reflect/Method; invoke 1 methodObject
based on their potential capability to evade static analysis tools specifically when they
provide parameters which are to be used in reflection/DCL calls. The first column in the
table represents the classes and the second column represents the corresponding meth-
ods which are considered as potential sources. Classes are grouped in categories, e. g.,
Crypto, Telephony, etc. X in the second column indicates that there are several methods
in the corresponding class which are considered to be potential sources, thus, we simply
did not enumerate all of them in the table. Similarly, X* represents that all the sub-
classes are also considered, e. g., subclasses of InputStream such as FileInputStream,
BufferedInputStream, etc.
Some of the categories, such as Telephony and Internet, are purely dynamic and cannot
be analyzed by static analysis tools. A malware developer can use these sources to com-
municate important parameters to the target APIs from a C&C server and thus a static
analysis tool has no way to determine the behavior of the app. Other categories, such as
InputStreams, Readers and Crypto, etc., include APIs that access resources which might
be available at the time of analysis. However, their use hardens analysis. For instance, an
app can retrieve the required parameters, using APIs from InputStreams/Readers cate-
gories, from a file which can be in any format while the analysis needs to know in advance
which format to expect.
As discussed in §3.3.1 earlier, to test the ability of existing tools to analyze such apps,
we developed a set of apps that leak sensitive information. These apps use reflection
APIs to call various sensitive APIs where the names of these APIs and their classes are
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provided as strings by some of the sources listed in Table 3.4, such as Hashtable, Crypto,
and InputStream. We analyzed these apps using Flowdroid [41], IccTa [78], SAAF [74],
Androguard [2], SCandroid [66] and Amandroid [104]. We observed that none of these
tools were able to successfully detect the concealed malicious functionality, which reflects
that the sources of the parameters used in reflection/DCL APIs play an important role
in complicating their analysis. It is worth mentioning here that some of the tools, such
as Flowdroid, SAAF, etc., can determine the targets of reflection calls to a certain extent
when the parameters used in reflection APIs are string constants provided in the code.
3.5.2 Dataset Description
Table 3.4: Sources of Parameters
Class Methods
Map, Hashtable
Ljava/util/Map; X*
Crypto
Ljavax/crypto/Cipher; doFinal
Ljavax/crypto/Cipher; update
Ljavax/crypto/CipherInputStream; read
Ljavax/crypto/Mac; doFinal
Ljavax/crypto/Mac; update
Ljavax/crypto/SealedObject; getObject
Telephony
Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager; X
Landroid/telephony/SmsManager; X
Internet
Ljava/net/URLConnection; X
Ljava/net/HttpURLConnection; X
Ljava/net/ssl/HttpsURLConnection; X
Ljava/net/JarURLConnection; X
Input Streams
Ljava/io/InputStream; X*
Readers
Ljava/io/Reader; X*
Content Resolver
Landroid/content/ContentResolver; X
For the analysis process, we created a
dataset of real world apps containing both
benign and malicious samples.
Google Play Store: The dataset con-
sists of 13,223 apps downloaded from the
Android official Google Play Store [25].
Although, there are instances of mali-
cious apps been published to the official
app store, Google Play Store uses Google
Bouncer as a vetting mechanism for the
apps submitted to the store. Hence, one
can safely assume that the probability of
a malicious app at the Google Play Store
is considerably lower as compared to other
markets.
F-droid: We added 3,305 apps down-
loaded from an online third party market,
i. e., F-droid [21]. F-droid also provides the
source code of the apps. Third-party app
markets usually contain a higher number
of malicious apps as these markets, most
of the times, do not analyze the apps be-
fore publishing them. However, these samples are assumed to be benign in our work as
they are flagged benign by most of the antivirus tools on VirusTotal [35].
To complement the downloaded benign apps, the dataset also consists of 3,645 malware
samples, in the form of .apk files.
Genome Project: 1,260 malware samples, divided into 49 families, are taken from
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the Malware Genome Project [116].
AndroidSandbox: 1,875 of the malware samples in our dataset are downloaded
from AndroidSandbox [4]. AndroidSandbox is an online malware analysis service, unfor-
tunately, out of service temporarily.
Contagio Mobile Malware Dump: The rest of the malware samples are down-
loaded from Contagio Blog [17]. Contagio Blog is a repository for collecting malware
samples. These samples are also downloadable for research purposes.
3.6 Analysis Results and Discussion
Experiment Design: We performed the experiment separately for the various app
sources as discussed in the previous section. Doing so, we had more control over when to
stop/start the analysis in case there is some problem. Moreover, this design of the exper-
iment later on helped in two ways, i. e., 1) comparing results from different app sources,
and 2) aggregating the results into two categories (malicious and benign).
We used two machines for the experiment. The first one is a desktop, Dell Precision
T1700, with a Quad-Core Intel(R) Xeon(R) 3.10GHz CPU and 8GB memory. The second
machine is an HP laptop having an Intel Core i7-2630QM 2.00GHZ CPU and 4GB of
memory. Analyzing all these apps with our tool on the two machines running in parallel
took roughly a month.
The analysis provides an idea about the prevalence of reflection/DCL usage, in real
world apps, in a manner which can be used to conceal malicious behavior and bypass app
vetting process deployed at app markets.
The goal of the analysis is to answer the following research questions:
• Q1: What is the distribution of different categories of reflection/DCL APIs (as
mentioned in §3.5) in both legitimate and malicious apps?
• Q2: How often do reflection/DCL APIs receive their parameters from one or more
source APIs (as mentioned in §3.5)?
• Q3: What is the share of individual source APIs among all the mentioned source
APIs in providing parameters to the target APIs?
• Q4: What is the highlight of the analysis results which is distinguishable in benign
and malicious apps?
Q1. Presence of Reflection/DCL APIs: It is important to mention that we are
only concerned with the developer’s code and do not consider the occurrences of the target
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Figure 3.3: Prevalence of Target APIs in the analyzed apps and Source APIs providing the
parameter passed to Target APIs
APIs in the Android framework itself. Figure 3.3(a) shows a graphical representation of
the prevalence of the three categories of the target APIs, i. e., Code, Class, Method, in
the analyzed apps. It shows that class loading and method invocation using reflection
is widely used in both legitimate as well as malicious apps. At the same time, usage of
additional code loading in the form of .jar/.dex/.apk is comparatively lower. The Black
bars in the graph show that the use of code loading in the form of .jar/.dex/.apk is
negligible in legitimate apps, whereas malicious apps tend to use this feature which helps
them evade static analysis tools.
Q2. Parameters from Source APIs: A small fraction of the total occurrences
of the target APIs in the analyzed apps receive their parameters from the source APIs,
mentioned in §3.5, which could potentially hinder static analysis tools. This fraction is
less even in malicious apps as shown in Figure 3.3(b), except for the Genome malware
dataset. The obvious reasoning behind these low numbers (or almost equal numbers in
legitimate and malicious apps) can be the fact that most of the malware samples are
repackaged versions of benign apps and, therefore, would use reflection/DCL in the same
manner in general. This necessarily implies that apps usually provide class names and
method names to reflection/DCL APIs as string constants, which is a good news for
static analysis tools. However, in order to evade static analysis tools, it is not necessary
to obfuscate the parameters of all the reflection/DCL calls, rather obfuscating those calls
which perform malicious behavior is enough. Moreover, the trend in malicious apps is to
provide a significant amount of benign functionality to lure the user into installing the
app and, also, surreptitiously perform some malicious functionality.
Q3. Contribution of Individual Source APIs: Apart from the bar representing
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Figure 3.4: Contribution of source APIs in providing arguments to Target APIs. X-axis represent
the various categories of source APIs.
the percentage of Dynamic Code Loading APIs taking its parameters from the source APIs
for the Genome malware dataset in Figure 3.3(b), the rest of the bars for all the apps
datasets hardly reach 10% . This behavior is more or less identical at this coarse level in
both legitimate as well as malicious apps. However, Figure 3.4, which provides a finer view
of the contributions of individual sources, reveals more about the behavior of legitimate
and malicious samples. Figure 3.4 shows the graph for the top 5 contributing source
API categories in each dataset. It reveals that most of the apps in both datasets, benign
and malicious, retrieve class and method names from Map/Hashtable and, therefore, it
is the prime contributor in providing parameters to reflection/DCL calls. One reason for
the high usage of Map/Hashtable can be the usage of DexGuard (a commercial Android
app obfuscator) [19]. Its string encryption mechanism uses byte-arrays and Maps for
obfuscating strings.
The other major contributing sources are Input Streams and Readers, which are used
to retrieve class and method names from configuration files either provided along with
the .apk package or provided at runtime. Both of these categories can be used to conceal
behavior and, therefore, their usage in malicious apps is slightly on the higher side. The
use of Telephony, however, is mostly found in malicious apps only. Apparently, there
are not many benign reasons for receiving class and method names via an SMS message.
However, for malicious apps, this mechanism could be used as a communication channel
to a C&C server.
Q4. Crypto APIs: In the initial experiment, we found very few instances of the
standard Crypto APIs being used as the sources of parameters for reflection/DCL in our
analyzed dataset. However, as shown in §3.2, malicious apps do use encrypted strings,
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which are only decrypted at runtime, as parameters of reflection/DCL calls. Therefore,
we further manually analyzed the AnserverBot family of the Genome dataset by disas-
sembling the .apk files and looking into the Smali code. We found out that AnserverBot
stores the code file names as encrypted strings and decrypts them at runtime when pass-
ing them on to DexClassLoader. However, it does not use the standard Crypto APIs to
decrypt these strings, but rather uses its own logic for decryption. We could not look into
all the apps for such encryption/decryption techniques, which could be another interesting
study, but understandably, using non-standard encryption/decryption techniques might
be more attractive to malware developers.
These results show that a wide range of real world apps, specifically malicious apps,
use reflection/DCL in a manner that enables them to bypass state-of-the-art automated
analysis tools. The increasing number of apps and the rapid evolution of anti-analysis
techniques found in modern day malware demand for more effective and sophisticated
automated analysis tools.
3.7 Considerations on Analysis Tools for Android
The combination of code update techniques along with anti-debugging, emulator detection
techniques and the ability to reveal malicious behavior only when particular conditions
(i. e., temporal) are met enables malware developers to bypass analysis tools. We propose
some recommendations that could be useful in detecting malware even in the presence of
evasive techniques.
Modern analysis tools need to have an efficient and effective dynamic analysis part
due to some inherent limitations of static analysis. We recommend to push for targeted
dynamic analysis where target APIs, such as those of reflection/DCL, are identified and
the application is triggered with inputs which make it follow the target paths. A tar-
geted triggering solution coupled with other solutions, such as those combining static
and dynamic analysis, will help in revealing malicious behavior otherwise concealed by a
malicious app.
Considering the problem of stimulating apps’ behavior during an analysis/debug en-
vironment, loadtime analysis of the code other than that contained in the standard .dex
file of an app can help detecting malicious code loading. Android framework can have an
analysis module which performs some lightweight on-device analysis of the code loaded
from arbitrary locations before loading it. [62] provides a library for secure class loading,
but they only check for the integrity of the code. Adding other forms of security analysis
to their solution would be more helpful.
According to Google’s policy, all the apps must use the Google Play store for their
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updates. However, this policy is not always enforced, as the BrainTest example shows.
An effective enforcement of this policy would result in catering the problem of malicious
code updates to an extent. Therefore, any app which downloads code from any location
other than the Google Play store should be deemed malicious and not allowed to do so.
3.8 Limitations
A non trivial number of apps were analyzed in the work discussed in the chapter and
should provide a fair view of reflection/DCL usage. However, we understand that the same
experiment on a much larger scale, possibly performed by app markets such as Google
play store, would result in providing a much better picture of the situation regarding how
benign and malicious apps use reflection/DCL.
The malware datasets, in particular, the one from the Genome Project, is a bit old
now keeping in view the rapid increase in the number of mobile malware samples. The
trend towards more obfuscation and sophistication in malware implies that the evasive
behavior would be more prevalent in newer malware samples.
We do not analyze native code, therefore, the sources of parameters coming from native
code are not considered in the analysis presented in this chapter. Moreover, the analysis
tool does not capture information flow to reflection/DCL calls obfuscated through other
reflective calls.
3.9 Related Work
Literature shows that there have been efforts to analyze apps in the presence of reflection
and DCL in Java as well as in Android. Livshits et al.’s work uses points-to analysis and
cast analysis to statically resolve the targets of reflection [80]. Similarly, Christensen et
al. use Java string analyzer to statically track the arguments passed to reflection APIs
to resolve their targets [52]. A static analysis tool for Android apps, Flowdroid, performs
data flow analysis and resolves the targets of reflection only when the parameters are
string constants [41]. However, none of them provides an analysis on the sources of the
parameters passed to these APIs and their possible contribution in concealing malicious
behavior. Moreover, Flowdroid also present a workbench of Android apps, Droidbench,
which can be used to test static analysis tools. However, the part of Droidbench focusing
on reflection is very basic and contains fewer apps in comparison to Reflection-Bench.
Hirzel et al. extend pointer analysis to resolve reflection, DCL and native code using
online (dynamic) analysis [73]. They instrument the virtual machine service that han-
dles reflection and DCL with handlers, which dynamically updates a constraint database
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during the program execution. Similarly, Bodden et al. propose TamiFlex which com-
plements static analysis of Java apps by resolving DCL and reflection [48]. TamiFlex
executes a Java app, which is modified using java.lang.instrument API, and logs the
information about DCL and reflection. However, similar to dynamic analysis, both these
techniques suffer from the triggering problem.
Poeplau et al. [90] have tried to solve the problem of dynamic code loading, potentially
malicious, using a whitelisting approach. Their whitelists are based on hashes of codes
to be loaded. They propose that only those pieces of code could be loaded dynamically,
which have their hashes available in the mentioned whitelist. They also developed a sample
malicious app and practically evaded Google Bouncer using DCL. Similarly, Canfora et
al. present composition malware where they present a model for evading analysis tools.
However, their focus is more on downloading the code from different places and combining
them at runtime to create malicious app logic [51]. However, in our work we present a
more generic evasion process used by malicious apps focusing on the underlying reflection
and DCL APIs and the sources of their parameters.
3.10 Chapter Summary
Dynamic code update features, such as reflection and DCL, are widely used in Android
apps to make them extensible. These features, however, attract malware developers due to
their potential capability of evading analysis tools when their parameters are obfuscated
or provided only at runtime. In this chapter, we demonstrated this fact by analyzing a set
of benchmark apps, Reflection-Bench, that conceal information leakage using reflection
with some of the state-of-the-art static analysis tools. As expected, the results of our
analysis reveal the ineffectiveness of static analysis tools in such situations.
We also developed a tool that analyzes Android apps and finds source/sink relation-
ships between certain potentially dangerous source APIs and reflection/DCL APIs. More-
over, to emphasize the importance of the parameters used in reflection/DCL APIs, we
analyzed a dataset of real world apps. The results of our analysis show that malicious
apps do try to hide the parameters of reflection/DCL APIs, by encrypting them or receiv-
ing them at runtime from the outside world, in order to bypass static analysis tools. The
results of our analysis combined with the study of the static analysis tools available today
for Android apps highlight the need for further research and development of analysis tools
that efficiently combine static and dynamic analysis.
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Chapter 4
StaDART: Combining Static and
Dynamic Analysis
Abstract
Static analysis of Android applications is inherently susceptible to be evaded by applica-
tions using dynamic code update techniques, i.e., dynamic class loading and reflection.
These techniques, now heavily used in modern real-world malware, thwart even the lat-
est of static analysis tools. Chapter 3 demonstrated this fact by testing some of the
state-of-the-art static analysis tools with Reflection-Bench and using InboxArchiver to
evade online analysis systems. In this chapter, we present StaDART, an extented version
of our previously proposed solution Stadyna [110], which combines static and dynamic
analysis of Android applications to reveal the concealed behavior of malware. Unlike
Stadyna, StaDART utilizes ArtDroid to avoid modifications to the Android framework.
Furthermore, we integrate it with a triggering solution, DroidBot, to make it more scal-
able and evaluate it with more Android applications. We present our evaluation results
with a dataset of 2,000 real world applications; containing 1,000 legitimate applications
and 1,000 malware samples.
4.1 Introduction
Ensuring users’ privacy and security is a major concern and requires adequate measures
from all the involved parties, such as application developers, framework providers, appli-
cation stores, etc. Android applications go through a vetting process, at some of the app
markets at least, before being published. For this purpose, Google makes use of Google
Bouncer at the official Google Play store. The vetting process generally uses some form
of static/dynamic analysis to scrutinize apps for malicious content and Google Bouncer
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is no different [89].
However, growing number of malware samples found in the Android echosystem reveals
that malware developers bypass such vetting processes using various evasion techniques.
Previous research shows that the use of dynamic code update techniques along with
various forms of obfuscation makes it extremely hard for the state-of-the-art analysis
tools to understand the behavior of an app [37, 90]. Thus, the use of these techniques in
newly found malware is not surprising [91].
This is particularly daunting when static analysis is used in order to check the security
of mobile applications (i.e., to detect the presence of malicious behavior). Indeed, Rastogi
et al. [95] mention reflection among the techniques that make most of the current static
analysis tools unable to detect malicious code. Additionally, static analysis is hindered
by the code that evolves dynamically, because some parts of the code are impossible to
discover or to analyze at installation time as they appear only at runtime. As a matter
of fact, existing state-of-the-art static analyzers for mobile applications (e.g., [41, 57, 74])
assume that the code base does not change dynamically and the targets of reflection calls
can be discovered in advance. This is a clear simplification of what happens in the real
world, where many apps rely on code base updated at runtime.
At the same time, previous approaches that enhanced static analyzers of Java code in
the presence of dynamic code update techniques (e.g., [48]) cannot be directly applied to
Android due to the differences in the platforms (in Android, load-time instrumentation
of classes is not available). Moreover, oﬄine instrumentation also cannot solve the prob-
lem because this approach breaks the application signature, while some apps check it at
runtime. If the signature does not correspond to some hardcoded value they may refuse
to work. In case of malicious apps this check may be used to conceal illicit behavior.
In this chapter, we present StaDART - an analysis system that combines static and
dynamic analysis to analyze apps in the presence of dynamic code updates. Instead of
relying on modifications to the Android framework, StaDART utilizes ArtDroid which
is an API hooking tool [56]. Furthermore, we integrate StaDART with DroidBot, a
triggering tool for Android apps, to make the analysis system fully automated. StaDART
is evaluated using a dataset of 2,000 real world apps and the results of our evaluation are
presented here.
Contributions:
• We propose, design and implement StaDART, a system that interleaves static and
dynamic analysis in order to reveal the hidden/updated behavior. By utilizing Art-
Droid, we avoid modifications to the Android framework and make it largely frame-
work independent. StaDART downloads and makes available for analysis the code
loaded dynamically, and is able to resolve the targets of reflective calls complement-
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Figure 4.1: System Overview
ing app’s method call graph with the obtained information. Therefore, StaDART
can be used in conjunction with other static analyzers to make their analysis more
precise.
• We integrate StaDART with DroidBot to make it fully automated and to ease the
evaluation. Moreover, we analyze a dataset of 2,000 real world apps (1,000 benign
and 1,000 malicious). Our analysis results show the effectiveness of StaDART in
revealing behavior which is otherwise hidden to static analysis tools.
• We plan to release our tool as open-source to drive the research on app analysis in
the presence of dynamic code updates.
4.2 An Overview of StaDART
The architecture of StaDART presented in Figure 4.1 comprises two logical components:
a server and a client.
The static analysis of an application is performed on the server. In this respect,
StaDART allows an analyst to easily plug in and use any static analyzer in its architecture.
The static analyzer on the server builds the initial method call graph (MCG) of the app,
integrates the results of the dynamic analysis coming from the client, and stores the results
of the scrutiny. The client part of StaDART is based on an API hooking technique,
ArtDroid, that intercepts dynamic code update APIs and captures dynamic behavior.
The client part can be hosted either on a real device or an emulator. The client runs the
application whenever the dynamic analysis is required.
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In action, our system interleaves the execution of the static and dynamic analysis
phases. However, to simplify the presentation, we describe them sequentially.
Preliminary analysis The server statically analyzes an app package and builds a MCG
of the application (see Step a in Figure 4.1; solid arcs denote edges resolved statically).
Dynamically loaded code cannot be analyzed during this phase and, thus, the correspond-
ing nodes and edges are not present in the MCG. Further, the names of methods called
through reflection may also not be inferred if they are represented as encrypted strings
or generated dynamically. Still, a static analyzer can effectively detect the points in the
MCG where the functionality of an application may be extended at runtime. Indeed, the
usage of reflection and DCL requires to use specific API calls provided by the Android
platform. The server detects these calls during the static analysis phase by searching
for methods where DCL and reflection API calls are performed. We call these methods
methods of interest (MOI).
Dynamic execution If any MOIs are detected in the application, StaDART installs the
app on the client (Step 2 ) and launches the dynamic analysis. The dynamic phase is
exercised to complement the MCG of the app and to access the code loaded dynamically.
The dynamic analysis is performed on a device (or an emulator) which uses ArtDroid for
API interception and adding StaDART client side functionality. The added functionality
logs all events when the app executes a call using reflection, or when additional code is
loaded dynamically. Along with these events, the client also supplies some additional
information, e.g., in case of a reflection call, the information about the called function, its
parameters and the stack trace (that contains the ordered list of method calls, starting
from the most recent ones) is added. In case of a DCL call, the path to the code file and
the stack trace are supplied. The information collected by the client is passed back to the
server side (Step 3 ).
Analysis consolidation The server performs an analysis of the obtained information.
In case a reflection call happens, the server complements the MCG of the app with a new
edge (in Figure 4.1, it is represented by a dashed arc). This edge connects the node of
the method that initiated the call through reflection (the node at the beginning) with the
one corresponding to the called function (the node at the end).
When DCL is triggered, the client captures the location of the code file. Using this
evidence, the server downloads the file (Step 4 ) containing the code, and performs the
static analysis on it. The MCG of the app is then updated with the obtained information
(see the part of the MCG in the dashed oval in Figure 4.1). Additionally, for each
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downloaded file the server analyzes whether it contains other MOIs. If it does, the list of
the MOIs for the application is updated. This allows StaDART to unroll nested MOIs.
The stack trace data for both the reflection and DCL cases is used to detect which MOI
initiated the call.
Marking suspicious behavior In Android, some API calls are guarded by permissions.
Since APIs protected by the permissions could potentially harm the system or compro-
mise a user’s data, the permissions must be requested in the AndroidManifest.xml file.
However, there is no actual check on the permissions required to execute the written code
and sometimes developers request more permissions than they actually use. In this case,
those apps are called overprivileged. Many researchers, e.g., Bartel et al. [45], identified
that malware, adware and spyware exploit additional permissions to get access to security
sensitive resources at runtime.
Based on these considerations, we classify the following app behavior patterns as
suspicious :
• An application dynamically loads code that contains API functions protected with
permissions. Indeed, malware may use this approach to evade detection by static
analyzers, as the security-sensitive code is loaded dynamically.
• An application uses reflection APIs to call an API method protected with a dan-
gerous permission1. This functionality can be used, for instance, to send malicious
SMS, which cannot be detected by static analysis tools because the name of the
SMS sending function is encrypted and decrypted only at runtime.
StaDART automatically detects such suspicious patterns and raises a warning if such
patterns occur during the analysis. Section 4.5 shows that indeed malware samples do
expose such suspicious patterns.
In addition, we further analyze the parameters passed to methods called using re-
flection APIs. Indeed, a suspicious pattern, i.e., a reflective call to an API guarded with
dangerous permission, in conjunction with suspicious parameters, e.g., a premium number
in case of the sendTextMessage() API, helps in identifying malicious behavior concealed
using reflection.
1Google classifies as “dangerous” permissions with higher-risk level that guard access to private user data or
device controls [3].
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4.3 Method Call Graph
Method call graphs (or function call graphs) identify the caller-callee relationships for
program methods. These structural representations of programs are widely used for dif-
ferent purposes. In the scope of Android, method call graphs are used, e.g., to detect
malware [67,70,76], to identify potential privacy leaks in applications [59,68,114], to find
vulnerabilities [101] and execution paths for automatic testing [113].
StaDART extends the initial MCG generated with a traditional static analyzer with
the information detected at runtime. Thus, if an application exposes dynamic behavior,
all mentioned approaches can benefit from the expanded MCG obtained with StaDART.
Example To visualize the capabilities of StaDART and the process of method call graph
expansion, we show the evolution using an example of a demo app. Figure 4.2(a) shows
the MCG of the app obtained with the AndroGuard static analyzer [2]. Figure 4.2(b)
shows the one gained with StaDART before dynamic execution phase, and Figure 4.2(c)
presents it with dynamic execution phase. The demo app dynamically loads some code
from an external .jar file at runtime and calls the loaded methods through reflection.
Figure 4.2(a) illustrates that AndroGuard identifies only the presence of ordinary
methods and DCL calls (Ellipse 1) but no further analysis is done about those. Yet,
Figure 4.2(b) shows that after preliminary analysis StaDART selects 3 paths, which are
surrounded by dashed ellipses. Ellipse 1 shows that a MOI (the dark grey node) invokes
a constructor (the dark green node) through reflection. Similarly, Ellipse 2 displays a
method invocation through reflection. Ellipse 3 depicts that a DCL call (the red node) is
performed in a MOI (the dark grey node).
During the dynamic analysis, StaDART adds the edges that are outlined by Ellipses 4-
7 (see Figure 4.2(c)). These ellipses show the cases when the MOIs are resolved and
corresponding nodes and edges are added to the MCG. Ellipse 4 shows that as a result
of a DCL call (the red node) a new code file has been loaded (the pink node). Ellipse 7
shows that a class constructor (the grey node) is called through reflection. Ellipse 5
shows a method invoked through reflection. This method contains an API call protected
by the Android permission indicated by the blue node in Ellipse 6. There are also nodes
and edges that appear as a result of the analysis of the code file (the pink node) loaded
dynamically. These nodes and edges are connected with the rest of the graph through the
reflection new instance call (see Ellipse 7).
Ellipses 2, 3, 8, 9 show other types of connections possible among nodes in a MCG
obtained with our tool. Ellipse 2 shows the connection between the class and its con-
structor, Ellipse 3 shows an ordinary relation between two methods, Ellipse 9 connects
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4.2: MCG of demo app Obtained with a) AndroGuard b) StaDART after Preliminary
Analysis c) StaDART after Dynamic Analysis Phase
the static initialization block and the class, and Ellipse 8 shows that the method is called
from the static initialization block.
Each node type is assigned with a set of attributes, not shown in the figures. The
analysis of values of these attributes can facilitate dissection of Android applications
accompanied by the expanded method call graph. For instance, each method node is as-
signed with attributes, which correspond to a class name, a method name and a signature
of this method. A permission node is assigned with a permission level along with the
information about the API call that it protects.
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4.4 Implementation
This section provides the implementation details of some key aspects of StaDART. The
workflow of our system operation is shown in Figure 4.3. App analysis starts at the
server side. All occurrences of reflection and DCL methods are identified in the code
of the application under analysis. In case neither of them is found, StaDART builds a
MCG of the app and exits. Otherwise, it starts the dynamic analysis on a device, which
utilizes ArtDroid to intercept dynamic code update APIs and constitutes the client part
of StaDART.
4.4.1 The server
The server side of StaDART is a Python program that interacts with a static analysis tool.
Currently, StaDART uses AndroGuard [2] as a static analyzer. AndroGuard represents
compiled Android code as a set of Python objects that can be manipulated and analyzed.
However, StaDART can work with any static analysis tool that is able to analyze apk
and dex files. To improve suspicious behavior detection we substituted the permission
map embedded in AndroGuard (built for Android 2.2 in [63]) with the one generated by
PScout [42] for Android 5.1.1, which is the latest API-permission mapping available in
the research community.
The pseudo-code of the main server function is presented in Algorithm 1. The server
starts the analysis of the provided app by extracting the classes.dex file (see Step 1, 2
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Algorithm 1 App Analysis Main Function Algorithm
1: function perform analysis(inputApkPath, resultsDirPath)
2: makeAnalysis(inputApkPath)
3: // Check if there are MOI
4: if !containsMethodsToAnalyze() then
5: performInfoSave(resultsDirPath)
6: return
7: end if
8: dev ← getDeviceForAnalysis()
9: package name← get package name(inputApkPath)
10: dev.install package(inputApkPath)
11: uid← dev.get package uid(package name)
12: messages← dev.getLogcatMessages(uid)
13: loop
14: msg ← dequeue(messages)
15: // analyzeStadartMsg contains a switch statement
16: // that selects a corresponding processing routine
17: // shown in Algorithms 2 and 3 based on the msg type
18: analyzeStadartMsg(msg)
19:
20: // Quit if a user finishes analysis
21: if finishAnalysis then
22: performInfoSave(resultsDirPath)
23: return
24: end if
25: end loop
26: end function
and 3 in Figure 4.3; Line 2 in Algorithm 1), and then dissects the extracted code. During
this step StaDART searches for all the occurrences of reflection and DCL calls in the code.
The list of searched patterns for these API calls is presented in Table 4.1.
If MOIs are found, StaDART selects a device (a real phone or an emulator) to perform
the dynamic analysis on (Line 8) and installs the app under analysis (Line 10) onto the
client (Step 5 in Fig. 4.3). After that the server obtains the UID of the installed package
(Line 11) and starts a loop (Lines 13-25) that analyzes, one by one, the messages (Line 12)
obtained using the logcat utility from the main log file of the Android system. Basically,
each obtained message is represented in the JSON format and contains values for the
following fields: UID (required), operation (required), stack (required), class (optional),
method (optional), proto (optional), source (optional), output (optional). The value of
the UID field is used to select the messages produced by the analyzed app. If the user
stops the analysis, StaDART saves the results and finishes its execution.
The function analyzeStadartMsg (Line 18) analyzes the selected StaDART messages
obtained from the client. It extracts the value of the operation field and based on this
value selects the appropriate routine to analyze the message.
The routines for the reflection messages analysis are similar, so we consider them on
the example when operation corresponds to reflection invoke. The algorithm for analysis
of the reflection invoke messages is shown in Algorithm 22. Lines 2 - 4 extracts the
2The algorithm for analysis of reflection newInstance messages is very similar so we do not show it.
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Table 4.1: The List of Searched Patterns
Class Method Prot.
Dynamic class loading
Ldalvik/system/PathClassLoader; < init > .
Ldalvik/system/DexClassLoader; < init > .
Ldalvik/system/DexFile; < init > .
Ldalvik/system/DexFile; loadDex .
Class instance creation through reflection
Ljava/lang/Class; newInstance .
Ljava/lang/reflect/Constructor; newInstance .
Method invocation through reflection
Ljava/lang/reflect/Method; invoke .
Algorithm 2 Analysis of the Reflection Invoke Message
1: function processReflInvokeMsg(message)
2: cls← message.get(JSON CLASS)
3: method← message.get(JSON METHOD)
4: prototype← message.get(JSON PROTO)
5: stack ← message.get(JSON STACK)
6: invDstFrCl← (class,method, prototype)
7: invPosInStack ← findF irstInvokePos(stack)
8: thrMtd← stack[invPosInStack]
9: invSrcFrStack ← stack[invPosInStack + 1]
10: for all invPathFrSrcs ∈ sources invoke do
11: invSrcFrSrcs← invPathFrSrcs[0]
12: if invSrcFrSrcs 6= invSrcFrStack then
13: continue
14: end if
15: addInvPathToMCG(invSrcFrSrcs, thrMtd, invDstFrCl)
16: if invPathFrSrcs ∈ uncovered invoke then
17: uncovered invoke.remove(invPathFrSrcs)
18: end if
19: return
20: end for
21: addV agueInvoke(thrMtd, invDstFrCl, stack)
22: end function
method name along with its class name and the prototype, which has been called through
reflection. Line 5 gets the stack from the message. Line 7 searches for the first reflection
invoke occurrence in the stack. The next stack entry corresponds to the method that
has performed the reflection call invSrcFrStack (Line 9). Then in the loop StaDART
compares this method with the list of MOIs extracted from the application executable
(Lines 10 - 20). If the method is found StaDART complements the MCG with the obtained
information (Line 15), and deletes it from the list of uncovered invoke MOIs (Line 17).
Otherwise, it adds this method to the list of vague methods (Line 21). This information
is later analyzed to see why the method calling reflection was not found in the application
executable during the static analysis phase.
The processing function for the DCL messages is slightly different (see Algorithm 3).
From the message received from the client the server extracts the source path of the
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Algorithm 3 Analysis of the DCL Message
1: function processDexLoadMsg(message)
2: source← message.get(JSON DEX SOURCE)
3: stack ← message.get(JSON STACK)
4: newFile← dev.get file(source)
5: newFilePath← processNewFile(newFile)
6: dlPathFrStack = getDLPathFrStack(stack)
7: if dlPathFrStack then
8: srcFrStack ← dlPathFrStack[0]
9: thrMtd← dlPathFrStack[1]
10: if dlPathFrStack ∈ uncovered dexload then
11: uncovered dexload.remove(dlPathFrStack)
12: end if
13: addDLPathToMCG(srcFrStack, thrMtd, newFilePath)
14: if !fileAnalyzed(newFilePath) then
15: makeAnalysis(newFilePath)
16: end if
17: return
18: end if
19: addV agueDL(newFilePath, stack)
20: end function
file containing the code loaded dynamically (Line 2). Using this information, StaDART
downloads the file locally (Line 4), and processes it (Line 5). This process includes
computation of the file hash and copying the file into the results folder with a new filename,
which includes the computed hash. The file hash allows us to check whether the file has
been already loaded and avoid analysis of already checked code. Otherwise, the code
analysis for MOIs is performed for the loaded code (Line 15). Function getDLPathFrStack
(Line 6) searches for a pair of a DCL call and a MOI in the stack corresponding to the
one extracted from the app executable. If this pair is found, then it is removed from the
list of uncovered DCL calls (Line 11). Otherwise, StaDART adds the information about
the dynamic class loading call into the list of vague calls (Line 19).
Notice that the presented algorithms are simplified versions of the ones actually im-
plemented in the server part. For instance, in a real application it is possible that the
same MOI acts like a proxy used to call different targets (e.g., the same method could be
used to load different code files). The real algorithms implemented in StaDART are able
to process these cases.
4.4.2 The client
The client side can run either on a real device or on an emulator. Using the emulator
is more convenient because one can run the client and server on the same machine. The
main drawback is that currently the Android emulator is quite slow. Moreover, mobile
applications may suppress some functionality if they detect they are running in an emu-
lated environment. With these limitations in mind, we implemented and tested our client
on a real device. However, the code is not device-dependent so it can be easily ported to
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an emulator or another device.
To capture the dynamic behavior offered by reflection and DCL, we intercept a number
of Android API methods that provide an interface to DCL and reflection capabilities. A
brief overview of these APIs is provided the earlier part of §4.4. Some of them have been
modified across different Android versions moving their implementation to the native side
(e.g., java.lang.Class.newInstance has only a native implementation in Android 6).
To achieve dynamic instrumentation of Java-level APIs we used the approach proposed
in ArtDroid [56] to intercept Java virtual methods. It intercepts all calls to monitored
Java virtual methods including calls via Java reflection, native code or dynamically loaded
code without any modification to both Android OS and the target app. In addition, we
integrated native function hooking capabilities in ArtDroid by means of inline hooking
technique. The client side employed by StaDART is completely Android version-agnostic
and it is able to interpose custom code on both Java methods and native functions.
Therefore, it can be used to analyze Android apps on any Android version intercepting
DCL and reflection calls irrespective of the actual code representation (i.e., Java or native).
To support all available Android versions, we included in StaDART the capability
of intercepting DCL and reflections calls according to the running Android version. In
the following we describe methods intercepted by StaDART on both Dalvik and ART
runtime. The code added by StaDART to perform requested analysis is not influenced
by the underlying Android version.
To obtain the information related to DCL we added a hook to the method openDexFile
of the DexFile class. This method is called when a new file with the code is opened. It
gets three parameters as an input, where sourceName is of our interest. Moreover, we
added a hook to the constructor of DexClassLoader class that is used to create a class
loader that loads classes from JAR and DEX files. It gets four parameters as an input,
where dexPath and optimizedDirectory are of our interest. The former specifies the
complete path of the DEX file that is being loaded while the latter is the directory where
the optimized version will be written to as a result of the compilation step. The added
code forms a JSON message that contains the path to the file, from which the code is
loaded (sourceName). Along with this information, the stack trace data and the UID of
the process are also added into the message, which is then printed out to the main log file
of Android.
To get the information about method invocation through reflection, a hook was placed
into the invoke method of the Method class. As of the release of Android version 6, this
method is defined as public native, thus the client will hook the appropriate function
by means of the proper hooking engine, according to the running Android version. Each
Method object has declaringClass, name and parameterTypes member fields, which
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represent class name, method name and prototype of the invoked method, respectively.
Moreover, invoke gets an array of Object type as input which represents the arguments
intended for the target method. This information along with the stack trace is put
into the StaDART message. Similarly, to log the information about new class creation
through reflection, we put our hooks into the newInstance method of the Class and
Constructor classes. As for the invoke, different hooks were added targeting newInstace
code representation for both DVM and ART runtime.
Each StaDART message contains the stack trace information. Stack trace is a sequence
of method calls performed in the current thread starting from the most recent ones. The
information from a stack trace is usually used to find the origin of an exception in a
program. In our case, the stack trace information is used to detect the MOI, which calls
the reflection or DCL methods. In essence, a stack trace is an array of stack trace elements.
Each stack trace element contains information about the class name, the method name
and the line number of the method call in the source code. Unfortunately, using only
this information it is not possible to uniquely identify the MOI, because we do not have
access to the source code of the application. Moreover, due to function overloading it
is possible to have several methods in a class with the same name. In the previous
version of StaDART (i.e., StaDyna), we had modified the StackTraceElement class so
that it can store the information about the method prototype, but this approach is not
feasible when it comes to dynamic instrumentation. To overcome this limitation and
detect MOIs from stack trace data even when they appear multiple times with same
name but different prototype, we employed a hybrid approach. First, we statically detect
potentially ambiguous methods declared in the target app and for each method found we
store its prototype information. Then, we dynamically instrument the app to insert a
shadow method that is basically an empty wrapper to distinguish the ambiguous method.
It is named as the concatenation of original method name plus its prototype stored by
the previous step. In this way, we are able to distinguish target MOIs by looking for them
into the stack trace data as it is normally returned by the Android OS. In fact, method
name and its prototype allow us to uniquely identify a method in a class.
A StaDART message has a header and a body. To distinguish StaDART messages
from other log messages we add a special marker to the header. The second part of
the message header is the part number. Currently, there is a limit on the length of the
Android log entries specified by the constant LOGGER ENTRY MAX PAYLOAD. To overcome
this problem, we added the functionality to the client that allows it to split a message
into several parts. The server takes care of assembling the original message.
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4.5 Evaluation
Experiment Setup and Test Suite: This section describes our application test suite
and reports on the results of our experiments. In order to evaluate StaDART, we tested
it on a dataset of real world applications, both benign and malicious. The server runs on
a machine with 3.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 8 GB DDR3 memory. The client is
a Google Nexus 6 smartphone running stock Android OS version 7.1.1 connected to the
server using a standard USB cable. The evaluation test suite consists of a set of 1,000
benign and 1,000 malicious applications. The benign applications were downloaded on
December 2016 and selected based on their popularity. The malware samples were selected
from Drebin [40] dataset populated by 5,560 applications from 179 different malware
families collected in the period of August 2010 to October 2012.
Evaluation Goal: Inline with the aim of StaDART, i.e., uncovering dynamic behav-
ior, we set certain research questions that this evaluation should answer as our evaluation
goal.
• RQ1: How widespread is the use of these dynamic code update features in the
analyzed dataset and does StaDART reveal dynamic behavior in each of the analyzed
app?
• RQ2: How effective is StaDART in expanding the MCGs? How expansion of MCGs
due to dynamic behavior differ in the malicious and benign dataset?
• RQ3: Does StaDART reveal potentially dangerous behavior, i.e., reveal nodes
guarded with permissions? How do they differ in benign and malicious apps?
• RQ4: Is there a correlation between the captured dynamic behavior and the APIs
used for dynamic code updates, e.g., DCL or reflection?
• RQ5: Do the analyzed apps show suspicious behavior, i.e., use additional new
permissions which are not used in the initial MCG? How does this behavior differ
in malicious and benign apps?
Analysis Results: Figure 4.4 illustrates the prevalence of dynamic code update APIs
in the analyzed dataset and the effectiveness of StaDART in expanding the MCGs. It
shows the percentage of apps with invoke, newInstance and DCL among both benign
and malicious app dataset. The right most bar represents the percentage of apps where
StaDART expanded the MCG. In the dataset, close to 90% of the apps use invoke and/or
newInstance APIs. Similarly, 48% of the apps use DCL feature which is considerably
higher to previous analysis results [110] (first part of RQ1). Increase in the number of
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Figure 4.4: Prevalence of Reflection/DCL and StaDART effectiveness in expanding MCG
apps using DCL could largely be related to the increasing complexity of the Android apps.
StaDART was able to expand the MCG by at least one node in 80% of the analyzed apps
(second part of RQ1).
In order to answer the question whether StaDART expands the MCGs over the entire
dataset and by how much?, Figure 4.5 shows the effectiveness of StaDART for analyzed
dataset, both benign and malicious. It shows the average percentage increase in the num-
ber of nodes, edges, nodes with normal permission and nodes with dangerous permissions.
Clearly, the lower percentage increase is attributed to apps that use only reflection as dy-
namic code update feature. The MCG expansion in these apps, which do not use DCL,
is minimal and more or less similar in benign and malicious apps (RQ2).
To clarify the role of DCL in MCG expansion and dynamic behavior, we extracted
the results from apps that use DCL. Figure 4.6 shows the effectiveness of StaDART when
the apps use DCL. It shows the average percentage increase in the number of nodes,
edges, nodes with normal permissions and nodes with dangerous permissions. It clearly
shows a considerably higher increase in the number of nodes, edges and nodes guarded
with permissions (both normal and dangerous). In addition, it can be seen that the
malicious apps hugely increase their code base when they use DCL (RQ4). Similarly, the
number of nodes guarded with permissions for malicious apps doubled or in some cases
quadrupled (RQ3). This clearly indicate that malicious apps make use of sensitive APIs
in the loaded code. We also check the added nodes for Signature level permission and
SignatureOrSystem level permission. However, we did not observe a noticeable increase
in the number of nodes guarded with these permissions.
Although, the high increase in the number of nodes guarded with dangerous permis-
sions is indeed suspicious, we investigate the analysis results further for a more suspicious
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Figure 4.6: MCG Expansion when apps use DCL
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malware behavior. In practice, malicious payloads are packaged inside legitimate apps
and their manifest files are modified to cover for the extra permissions needed by the
payload. In this scenario, the final MCG of the app contains nodes guarded with new
permissions, i.e., those not found in the initial MCG. Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 show the
distribution of apps based on increase in the number of nodes guarded with permissions
in the form of pie-charts, in benign apps and malware, respectively. Here we discuss only
those apps which use DCL. The white part shows the percentage of apps with no increase
in the number of nodes guarded with permissions, whereas the grey part represents the
percentage of apps with increase in the number of nodes guarded with permissions. The
darker grey part shows the percentage of apps where new permissions are used in the
dynamically added part using StaDART.
98%
2%
No Increase
Increase
New Perms
Figure 4.7: Benign Apps with increase in permission nodes
The pie-chart for the benign apps shows that a very small fraction of the apps observe
an increase in the number of nodes guarded with dangerous permissions. In contrast,
a considerably higher number of malicious apps reveal such behavior. Also, in none of
the benign apps in the dataset, the loaded coded contained nodes guarded with new
dangerous permission. However, all the malicious apps in the dataset that loaded code
dynamically contained nodes guarded with at least one new dangerous permission (RQ5).
Moreover, a further analysis of the loaded code in malicious apps reveals a pattern of
dangerous permissions, e.g., READ PHONE STATE and INTERNET, that could be associated
with malicious functionality, such as privacy leakage, etc.
Also, noteworthy here is the fact that the revealed behavior is only due to triggering of a
small fraction of the total MOIs. Albeit the most advance automated triggering tool in the
research community, DroidBot does not serve well for app exploration from a security point
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Figure 4.8: Malicious Apps with increase in permission nodes
of view. Taking into account the low exploration that DroidBot achieved in most of the
apps and the suspicious results that we observed, the actual hidden suspicious/malicious
behavior could be alarming.
Our results show evidence that malware samples are more overprivileged (they contain
more permission types required for the code loaded dynamically), so it is valid to identify
the apps as suspicious if they are overprivileged. Yet, as benign apps can be overprivileged
too, more research is required to understand if an application is benign or malicious, and
StaDART can be handy in exploration of this topic.
4.6 Discussion
For any dynamic (or hybrid for that matter too) analysis tool, coverage is the main
limiting factor and StaDART is no different in that regard. For StaDART the coverage
of MOIs (the ratio between the number of executed MOIs at least once and total number
of discovered MOIs) is especially important. In order to achive higher MOI coverage,
we explored if the tools like monkey [34] can be handy. However, in our experiments
we found out that pseudo-random events generated by the tool do not produce tolerable
coverage values for MOIs. Therefore, we opted for a more advance automated triggering
tool, DroidBot, to trigger MOIs. However, as discussed in the previous section, even
DroidBot did not achieve reasonable coverage of MOIs.
A possible approach to achieve satisfying values is to use systems like SmartDroid [113].
SmartDroid allows an expert to specify sensitive API methods required to be triggered. In
case of StaDART the sensitive API methods correspond to reflection and DCL calls. Other
possible tools, which may be useful in developing fully automatic approach, are [46,94,108].
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Another possible direction to reduce the dependence on the triggering tool is to resolve
as many targets of reflection calls as possible statically, at least those which are represented
by constant strings [74]. The analysis performed in [63] has shown that it was possible
to resolve automatically the targets of reflection calls in 59% of applications that used
reflection. At the same time, the analysis was performed for the “closed world” scenario,
which is not realistic, given that dynamic class loading is a popular technique for modern
apps. Consequently, we can minimize the more expesive dynamic part of the analysis.
Usually, dynamic analysis allows an expert to explore only one execution path at a
time. However, dynamic traces may differ depending on the context of the execution,
e.g., some methods may contain calls invoked with parameters affecting the reflection call
target. Therefore, another direction for improving StaDART is to incorporate information
obtained during different runs of analysis.
StaDART has also other limitations. Its analysis is based on the UID of an application.
However, it is possible in Android that several apps have the same UID. In this case,
StaDART will also collect the information produced by other apps with the same UID.
At the same time, this information will not be used to complement MCG, but will be
added to the category of vague calls that need to be manually analyzed later.
4.7 Related Work
Being the most popular mobile OS, Android has won this position due to the openness of
its ecosystem and the ease with which developers can publish apps on Google Play and
third-party markets. Yet the openness comes at the price of large volumes of malware
apps polluting the ecosystem. One approach to tackle security and privacy of mobile apps
is to extend the security controls of the platform to detect misbehaving apps or to enforce
the desired security policy [55, 112]. Solutions following this approach, often require to
modify the system image.
Another approach, more relevant to StaDART, consists in the analysis of the mobile
application code. Many static and dynamic analysis techniques have been proposed for
Android. The ded system [59] re-targets Dalvik bytecode into Java class files that can
be analyzed by the variety of tools developed for Java. In the original paper [59] the
FortifySCA static analysis toolset was used for detecting vulnerabilities and dangerous
functionality, like leaking the device IMEI. DroidAlarm [114] performs static detection of
privilege-escalation vulnerabilities in apps by constructing paths in inter-procedural call
graphs from a sensitive permission to a public interface accessible to other apps. StaDART
complements these static analysis techniques by completing inter-procedural call graphs.
Hu et al. proposed to explore functional call graphs (FCG) and rely on graph similarity
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metrics to detect malware based on known malware graph patterns [76]. Gascon et al.
continue this research direction for Android with a technique to detect malware apps based
on comparing FCGs that are mined with AndroGuard [67]. StaDART can complement
these techniques by providing more precise graphs required for analysis.
TaintDroid was among the first dynamic analysis tools for Android apps [58]; it allows
to track propagation of information via the TaintDroid infrastructure-equipped smart-
phone software stack. Sources of sensitive information are typically the device sensors
or private user information, and sinks are network interfaces; thus the main scope of
TaintDroid is detection of privacy leaks. This approach is followed by DroidScope [108].
DroidScope allows to emulate app execution and trace the context at different levels of
the Android software stack: at the native code level, at the Dalvik bytecode level, at
the system API level, and at the combination of both native and Dalvik levels. While
executing an app in DroidScope a security analyst can track events at different levels and
instrument parameters of invoked methods to discover a malicious activity.
Dynamic analysis techniques are especially difficult to automate due to the need of
emulating a comprehensive interactions of applications with the system and a user (UI
interactions). Several approaches are proposed to automate the triggering of UI events,
from random event generation [75] to more advanced approaches like AppsPlayground [94]
and SmartDroid [113]. However, all of them still have many limitations on the type of
events they can handle and the coverage.
Poeplau et al. [90] have identified the problem of dynamic code loading in Android
apps. The authors selected possible vulnerable patterns of dynamic code loading and built
a tool that can analyze Android apps for the found patterns. Moreover, they propose to
use whitelists to prevent dynamic code loading that can potentially expose dangerous
behavior. Whitelisting prevents unauthorized code from running. To get authorization
the code must either signed [111] and its signature has to be included into a special list
distributed by trusted authorities. However, as mentioned in the article [90], extraction of
the dangerous behavior is a difficult problem by itself, especially when the protected API
is called through reflection. In contrast, StaDART aims not at preventing this loading
(because a lot of legitimate apps use it and extra complications will not be welcomed by
the developers) but at its analysis.
Reflection and Dynamic Class Loading in Java Gaps in the static analysis techniques
in the presence of dynamic class loading, reflection and native code were previously stud-
ied for Java. For example, similarly to our approach, in [73] a pointer analysis (based
on program call graphs) technique for the full Java language is extended by address-
ing dynamic class loading and reflection via an “online” analysis, when a call graph is
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built dynamically based on the program execution, and dynamic class loading, reflection
and native code are treated in real time by modifying the pointer analysis constraints
accordingly.
A run-time shape analysis for Java is investigated in [49]. Traditionally a shape analysis
operates based on the call graph of a program, and it allows to conclude how the heap
objects are linked to each other (e.g., if a variable can be accessed from several threads).
Yet in Java the call graph produced from a program can be incomplete; and [49] suggests
how to execute an incremental shape analysis when the call graph evolves dynamically.
Our proposal does not involve a shape analysis, yet the ideas behind our proposal and [49]
are similar.
Livshits, Whaley and Lam have studied the reflection analysis for Java [80]. They
propose refinement for the static algorithms to infer more precise information on approx-
imate targets of reflective calls, as well as to discover program points where user needs to
provide a specification in order to resolve reflective targets.
Relevant to StaDART is TamiFlex [48] that complements static analysis of Java pro-
grams in the presence of reflection and custom class loaders. Using the load-time Java
instrumentation API TamiFlex modifies the original program to perform logging of class
loading and reflection call events. This information is used to seed a tool that performs
static analysis of the program having the information obtained during the dynamic anal-
ysis phase. This work differs from StaDART in several aspects. First, TamiFlex uses
a special Java API that is not available in Android. Second, although in Android it is
possible to instrument an app before loading it on a device (oﬄine instrumentation), some
Android apps check the application signature in its code that is changed during the patch-
ing. Thus, for these applications the TamiFlex approach will not work in Android. Third,
TamiFlex requires some debug information (the line number of the function call) to be
present. In Android during the obfuscation phase this kind of information may be deleted
from the final package. Therefore, the TamiFlex approach will not work, while StaDART
is able to process correctly this case due to dynamic API hooking using ArtDroid.
4.8 Chapter Summary
Today mobile applications make an extensive use of dynamic capabilities, namely reflec-
tion and dynamic class loading, available in the Android OS. Being adopted from Java,
these techniques in Android incur an additional threat because the loaded code receives
the same privileges as the loading one. Malicious apps can leverage these facilities to
conceal their malicious behavior from analyzers.
In this chapter we presented StaDART, a technique that interleaves static and dy-
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namic analysis in order to scrutinize Android applications in the presence of reflection
and dynamic class loading. Our approach makes it possible to expand the method call
graph of an application by capturing additional modules loaded at runtime and additional
paths of execution concealed by reflection calls. In order to produce the expanded call
graph, StaDART relies on code interposition based on a dynamic API hooking technique.
It does not require any modification to the Android framework or the application itself.
As observed from the evaluation results malware apps were more inclined to exhibit a
suspicious increase in dangerous permissions after dynamic loading of new code, proving
that StaDART is an effective hybrid approach able to detect and capture apps’ dynamic
capabilities used at runtime.
The results produced by StaDART can then be fed to the state-of-the-art analyzers in
order to improve their precision (for instance, a reachability analysis will be more precise
over the expanded MCG than over the original one). Thus, StaDART may help malware
analysts by increasing their ability to detect suspicious samples.
Chapter 5
TeICC: Targeted Execution of ICC
Effective analysis of applications is essential to understanding their behavior. Two analysis
approaches, i.e., static and dynamic, are widely used; although, both have well known
limitations. Static analysis suffers from obfuscation and dynamic code updates. Whereas,
it is extremely hard for dynamic analysis to guarantee the execution of all the code paths
in an app and thereby, suffers from the code coverage problem. However, from a security
point of view, executing all paths in an app might be less interesting than executing certain
potentially malicious paths in the app. In this chapter, we present a hybrid approach that
combines static and dynamic analysis in an iterative manner to cover their shortcomings.
We use targeted execution of interesting code paths to solve the issues of obfuscation
and dynamic code updates. Our targeted execution leverages a slicing-based analysis
for the generation of data-dependent slices for arbitrary methods of interest (MOI) and
on execution of the extracted slices for capturing their dynamic behavior. Motivated by
the fact that malicious apps use Inter Component Communications (ICC) to exchange
data [78], our main contribution is the automatic targeted triggering of MOI that use
ICC for passing data between components. We implement a proof of concept, TeICC,
and report the results of our evaluation.
5.1 Introduction
Mobile apps are analyzed for malicious contents before being published to app stores,
such as Google Play Store. The analysis usually involves two categories, i.e., static
(reasoning about an app without executing it) and dynamic (executing apps in a controlled
environment and understanding their behavior). Both of these analysis techniques have
their pros and cons. While the former provides an over-approximation of what a piece of
code actually performs, the latter misses certain execution paths due to limited duration of
the analysis and the triggering problem. Static analysis also suffers from code obfuscation
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problems and dynamic code updates. Dynamic analysis, on the other hand, provides a
solution to these problems, but requires test cases which could execute a major/required
portion of the code.
Execution of certain code paths in mobile apps depends upon a combination of var-
ious user/system events. Generally, it is hard to predict inputs which can stimulate the
required behavior in these apps. This feature of mobile apps is widely used by malware
developers to conceal malicious functionality.
Code coverage is a well-known limitation of dynamic analysis approaches. However,
for the purpose of security analysis rather than testing, it is required to stimulate/reach
only specific points of interest (POI) in the code rather than stimulating all the code
paths in an app. In literature, researchers have focused mainly on providing inputs to
make an app follow a specific path. Providing the exact inputs and environment becomes
very hard as different apps may require different execution environments. Moreover, not
all inputs can be predicted statically, because of obfuscation or other hiding techniques.
In this chapter, we propose a fully automated hybrid system which uses a slicing
based approach for target triggering of a given MOI. It performs static data-flow anal-
ysis [38, 65] based on program slicing technique [105] to extract target slices which hold
data-dependency with the parameters used by the given MOI. Moreover, our slicing ap-
proach permits slice extraction following the ICC flow across different app components.
Importance of ICC in malware for sharing sensitive data is shown by Bodden et al. in [78].
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing approaches [43,93] for targeted
triggering support the extraction of interesting paths across different Android components.
In our proof of concept, TeICC, we leverage an enhanced version of SAAF to achieve
program slicing [74]. We modified SAAF adding more sensitivity and support for ICC
using a System Dependency Graph (SDG) (cfr. §5.3). Besides that, TeICC, employs
a modified version of Stadyna [110] which integrates ArtDroid [56] to support dynamic
execution of the extracted slices to resolve obfuscation and dynamic code updates. It runs
on a real device/emulator with no modification to the Android framework.
TeICC operates in an iterative manner where a SDG helps extraction of slices across
multiple components for targeted execution and targeted execution overcomes the limita-
tions of static analysis by resolving obfuscation and dynamic code updates. It results in
construction of an improved SDG and extraction of extended slices for better analysis of
apps.
Contributions:
• We extend the backward slicing mechanism to support ICC, i.e., extract slices across
multiple components. Moreover, we enhance SAAF to perform data flow analysis
with context-, path- and object-sensitivity.
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• Targeted execution of the extracted inter-component slices without modification to
the Android framework.
• We design and implement a hybrid analysis system based on static data-flow analysis
and dynamic execution on real-world device for improved analysis of obfuscated apps.
5.2 Motivating example
The rising use of techniques such as obfuscation and ICC for information leakage by
newly found malware motivates this work. Existing analysis approaches generally do not
support information-flow analysis across multiple app components in obfuscated apps.
As a result, malware use these features for evading these analysis tools. As reported by
different antivirus companies [1, 27, 29, 31, 33], obfuscated malware has started to show
up more frequently. This trend poses a strong challenge for the current static analysis
tools, which are unable to automatically analyze apps in the presence of obfuscation or
dynamic code loading. Furthermore, as demonstrated in [78], the ICC mechanism offered
by Android is used by both normal and malicious apps for passing data between different
Android components.
Listing 5.1: MessageReceiver
1 public class MessageReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
2 public void onReceive(Context context , Intent intent) {
3 SharedPreferences v3 = ...
4 Map v0 = this.retrieveMessages(intent);
5 Iterator v6 = v0.keySet ().iterator ();
6 while(v6.hasNext ()) {
7 Object v2 = v6.next();
8 Object v5 = v0.get(v2);
9 Intent v4 = new Intent(context , SendService.class);
10 v4.putExtra("number", (( String)v2));
11 v4.putExtra("text", (( String)v5));
12 context.startService(v4);
13 [...]
14 }
15 } }
Listing 5.2: SendService
1 public class SendService extends IntentService {
2 protected void onHandleIntent(Intent intent) {
3 if(v1.equals("REPORT_INCOMING_MESSAGE")) {
4 Sender.request(this.httpClient , "http ://37.1.204.175/? action=command
", RequestFactory
5 .makeIncomingMessage(v2 , intent.getStringExtra("number"),
intent.getStringExtra(
6 "text")).toString ());
7 return;
8 }
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9 }}
10 public class Sender {
11 public static JSONObject request(DefaultHttpClient hc, String serverURL ,
String data) throws Exception {
12 HttpPost v1 = new HttpPost(serverURL);
13 StringEntity v3 = new StringEntity(data , "UTF -8");
14 HttpResponse v2 = hc.execute ((( HttpUriRequest)v1));
15 }
16 }
To ease the understanding of our contributions, we are going to introduce a code
snippet of a real-malware sample reported by FireEye in [22]. Listing 5.1 shows the de-
obfuscated version of the code used to intercept and then report the incoming SMS. The
forwarding process is defined in a service component. The MessageReceiver (line 2) is
called for each incoming SMS and then an Android service is started by an Intent (line
12). The number and text data are stored within the Intent (lines 10, 11). Note that
the original obfuscated malware uses string encryption on the constant string along with
Java reflection for calling ICC methods. Then the started service, shown in Listing 5.2,
gets data from the incoming Intent (lines 5, 6) and leaks (line 14) SMS number and text
via a remote server connection (the server IP address string was obfuscated as well).
To the best of our understanding, static analyzers [69, 78, 87, 88], are not successful
in analyzing such cases because of both encryption and reflection techniques used by
this malware sample. Moreover, also hybrid approaches proposed in [93] and [43] cannot
properly analyze the sample because they lack support for ICC.
5.3 Our approach
(a) SDG - First Iteration (b) SDG - Second Iteration
Figure 5.1: SDG during the first and second iteration. Comp: Component
During a normal execution of an Android app, the control transfers between various
components based on certain user or system events. In order to trigger a specific piece of
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code inside an app, it is important to provide the exact user/system events in a specific
order to make it follow the target path. We take a slightly different approach based on
isolating target execution paths from within the app and executing them; thereby avoiding
to rely on user/system events. Target execution paths are isolated by means of a slice
extraction mechanism that leverages backward program slicing across various components
of the app.
5.3.1 Slice Extraction
Backward code slicing is a static analysis technique that identifies the data flow to a certain
variable v at point p in the program while tracking the code in backward direction. In the
process it identifies all the code instructions I which directly or indirectly affect the value
of v at point p. This set of instructions I is called a backward slice. An important property
of a backward slice is that it can execute independently of the rest of the program.
We leverage this property of the backward slice in our approach. Our backward slicing
mechanism starts from a target point and traverses the code in backward direction until
it reaches an entry point in the app. Instructions corresponding to each target point are
marked accordingly and extracted from the program to be refined and executed sepa-
rately. In simple apps, a backward slice may belong to a single app component. However,
the complexity of apps these days demands for more inter component communication.
Therefore, approaches based on extracting slices from only a single component might
miss critical information passed through ICC.
5.3.2 Inter-Component Communication
Our approach extends backward slicing across multiple app components. We build a
System Dependency Graph (SDG) before starting slice extraction. A SDG is a represen-
tation of the program highlighting the inter-connectivity and program flow among various
components. Figure 5.1 provides a simplified representation of a SDG. The nodes in the
SDG represent components which are connected to each other with directed edges where
the direction shows the flow of execution from one component to the other. A SDG also
provides information about the nature of the components, i.e., activity, service, broadcast
receiver, etc. This information is not shown in the figure where we simply refer to them
as CompX. The backward slicing assisted by the SDG then extracts slices which may
contain instructions from multiple components.
Listing 5.3: Extracted and Refined Slice
1 public class MessageReceiver_fake extends BroadcastReceiver {
2 public void onReceive(Context context , Intent intent) {
3 Map v0 = MessageReceiver_fake.retrieveMessages(intent);
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4 Iterator v6 = v0.keySet ().iterator ();
5 while(v6.hasNext ()) {
6 Object v2 = v6.next();
7 Object v5 = v0.get(v2);
8 Intent v4 = new Intent(context , SendService_fake.class);
9 v4.setAction("REPORT_INCOMING_MESSAGE");
10 v4.putExtra("number", (( String)v2));
11 v4.putExtra("text", (( String)v5));
12 context.startService(v4);
13 }
14 }
15 }
16 public class SendService_fake extends IntentService {
17 public void onCreate () {
18 [...]
19 this.httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient ();
20 }
21 protected void onHandleIntent(Intent intent) {
22 String v2 = SendService.settings.getString("APP_ID", " -1");
23 Sender.request(this.httpClient , "http ://37.1.204.175/? action=command",
RequestFactory
24 .makeIncomingMessage(v2 , intent.getStringExtra("number"), intent
.getStringExtra(
25 "text")).toString ());
26 }}
Our approach uses an iterative mechanism which works in a CreateSDG-ExtractSlice-
Execute cycle. Each phase in this cycle provides input for the next phase. SDGs help
in extracting slices across multiple components and extracted slices simplify execution of
target points in the app. Similarly, the execution phase helps in resolving obfuscation and
dynamic code updates which leads to improved creation of the SDG in the next iteration.
Figure 5.1(a) and 5.1(b) show a SDG in two iterations. In the first iteration, TeICC
finds the obvious non-obfuscated ICC links only. Therefore, the SDG contains Comp4
and Comp5 which are isolated components. The second iteration reveals that the app
has obfuscated ICC links from Comp2 to Comp5 and from Comp3 to Comp4 as shown
in Figure 5.1(b). This process carries on until the SDG reaches a stable point. At this
stage, all the obfuscated links are resolved and the slices are ready for the final execution
to capture and analyze suspicious behavior.
Most of the state-of-the-art analysis tools would fail to extract the complete slice in the
case of the sample described in §5.2. However, TeICC allows the extraction of such data-
dependent slices because it can follow the ICC flow across multiple components. Listing
5.3 shows the resulting slice extracted and refined by TeICC; it shows the corresponding
aggregated Java code to ease the understanding.
CHAPTER 5. TEICC: TARGETED EXECUTION OF ICC 73
5.3.3 Slice Execution
The extracted slices are put together in one or more resultant components where the irrele-
vant instructions are removed as shown in Listing 5.3. Similarly, the AndroidManifest.xml
file is also modified to include entries for these resultant components and remove irrelevant
ones. The enriched app is then assembled and signed. The flow of the app is hijacked
using a stub code so that it executes the resultant component after it is launched. The
app is then installed and run on a real device or emulator. The target slice is executed
once the resultant component is started. Similarly for each extracted slice, a resultant
component is added to the app. The app is observed during execution of the resultant
components to capture the target behavior of the app.
5.4 Design and Implementation
TeICC is a hybrid system composed of various static and dynamic analysis modules. Here
we describe the design, implementation and work-flow of TeICC.
5.4.1 Overview
Figure 5.2 illustrates a high level design of TeICC. TeICC consists of a Static Analyzer,
a Slice Analyzer and an App Executor module. The Static Analyzer further relies on
a disassembler to convert an app’s compiled Dalvik bytecode to Smali code [71]. The
Smali files are then taken as input by the SDG Generator to create the first iteration of a
SDG. The Slice Extractor assisted by the SDG performs backward program slicing on the
Smali files to extract target slices, for the list of MOIs provided as an XML file, across
multiple components. The Slice Analyzer module refines the slices by removing irrelevant
instructions and merging them in the resultant components as shown in Listing 5.3. The
Slice Assembler part of this module assembles the modified app Smali files and signs the
APK file.
The App Executor module takes the app under analysis as input and installs it on
a device for dynamic execution of the target slices. The purpose of the execution of
target slices is two-fold. One for de-obfuscation and resolving the targets of dynamic code
updates, such as reflection and dynamic class loading. The other purpose is to capture any
sensitive/malicious behavior. For handling dynamic code updates, we utilize a modified
version of Stadyna [110] that can resolve the targets of reflection and handle the code
loaded dynamically. In order to capture sensitive behavior of app, we leverage an API
hooking tool, ArtDroid [56], to hook sensitive APIs, such as dynamic code update APIs
or the sendTextMessage() API, etc.
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Figure 5.2: TeICC Design
5.4.2 Enhancement to Backward Slicer
Our backward slicing mechanism is based on an enhanced version of SAAF which performs
static analysis of Android apps on Smali code [74]. We added certain features to it to
overcome some of its limitations.
We extended SAAF to perform backward slicing across multiple components. This
extended backward slicing is guided by a SDG when the start of a component is encoun-
tered. The backward slicing process continues until it reaches an entry point of the app
according to the SDG. The entry point is a node in the SDG which has no predecessor.
Moreover, we added a slice extraction feature to SAAF, i.e., to mark all the instructions
in the backward slice and write them to another file for further analysis.
Apart from extending backward slicing to cover ICC, we added other features which
are important for the soundness of static analysis. The most important features we added
are path-, context- and object-sensitivity [79]. Context- and object-sensitivity is essential
to extracting slices across multiple components. We also utilize path-sensitivity where
the conditions leading to different paths are resolvable. In cases where these conditions
are not resolvable, we use an approach similar to the one used in [93].
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5.4.3 Capturing Dynamic Behavior
The idea behind a multiphase iterative model is to overcome the shortcomings of both
static and dynamic analysis. TeICC relies on a modified version of Stadyna to handle
reflection and dynamic code loading [110]. Originally, Stadyna is based on modifications
to Android framework (Android 4.2) to resolve the targets of reflection and integrate the
code loaded dynamically to the original code base for further analysis. We re-implemented
Stadyna removing the need of Android framework modification by using ArtDroid.
We used ArtDroid to hook framework APIs used for dynamic code updates as well as
those responsible for sensitive behavior. By intercepting calls to the dynamic code APIs,
App Executor provides a feedback to the Static Analyzer for improved creation of SDGs
and extended backward slices. In addition, sniffing on sensitive API calls enables TeICC
to put a check on suspicious app behavior.
5.5 Evaluation and Discussion
This section presents experimental results that characterize the effectiveness of TeICC to
analyze apps that conceal sensitive information flow using obfuscated ICC. We evaluate
TeICC on two benchmark test suites, DroidBench [20] and ICC-Bench [104], specifically
crafted for testing tools to detect information flow concealed using ICC. ICC-Bench in-
cludes 9 test case apps and DroidBench contains 23 apps included in the InterCompo-
nentCommunication test case. The goal of evaluation of TeICC is to test its capability to
extract slices across multiple components in obfuscated apps and execute them. Therefore,
we obfuscated these ICC-based test suites using DexGuard [19] to evaluate TeICC.
Table 5.1 shows evaluation results for both DroidBench and ICC-Bench test suites.
For brevity we group the apps in categories. The second column contains the number
of ICC links found by TeICC while the third and fourth column show if the apps have
been correctly analyzed by IccTA [78] and TeICC, respectively. The symbol 8 means
that the tool has failed to analyze the app and the symbol 4 means that the app has
been properly analyzed. Not surprisingly, TeICC outperforms IccTA on both tests since
IccTA cannot detect ICC methods called by Java reflection and encrypted strings used in
intents. As shown in Table 5.1, TeICC can automatically extract-then-execute 100% of
ICC flows in all apps; except for those which perform ICC involving a Content Provider
because currently TeICC does not provide support for Content Providers. Unfortunately,
we cannot evaluate Harvester [93] because it is not open source. However, we understand
that it will not be successful as well because it does not support slicing across different
Android components.
Our results indicate that TeICC permits to effectively extract-then-execute the target
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Apps ICC IccTa TeICC
DroidBench
startActivity[1-7] 2/9 8 4
startActivityForResult[1-4] 0/8 8 4
sendBroadCast1 0/1 8 4
sendStickyBroadCast1 0/1 8 4
startService[1-2] 0/2 8 4
bindService[1-4] 0/4 8 4
ContentProvider[1-4] 4/0 8 8
ICC-Bench
Explicit1 0/1 8 4
Implicit[1-6] 7/0 8 4
DynRegister[1-2] 2/0 8 4
Table 5.1: DroidBench/ICC-Bench apps. ICC: # of implicit/explicit transitions between com-
ponents.
slices obtained from the program slicing analysis. If, for instance, the target app contains
checks which could prevent the dynamic analysis (i.e., emulation detection, integrity
checks, etc.), they are not extracted in the slicing step (unless they hold a data dependence
with the MOI).
In contrast to Harvester [93], TeICC supports the ICC mechanism which enables it to
automatically extract-and-execute target slices that belong to different Android compo-
nents. Similarly, R-Droid [43] lacks support for both ICC and Java reflection mechanisms.
Compared to IccTa [78], TeICC, based on a hybrid approach, permits to enrich the origi-
nal app after its targeted execution to resolve obfuscated parts of the app. Over different
executions it permits to extract runtime values from reflection calls or dynamically loaded
code and integrate them in the analysis for the next iteration.
At the moment TeICC does not support the Content Provider component; we leave it
as future work. Moreover, it does not analyze native code. For instance, if an SMS message
is sent from native code, TeICC cannot use this hidden call to sentTextMessage() as MOI.
However, just like TeICC, both [93] and [43] also do not support native code analysis.
5.6 Related Work
In the last few years, researchers have proposed several static analysis frameworks specif-
ically for Android. Most of these frameworks [41, 68, 69, 78, 82] employ different type of
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sensitivity, e.g., field sensitivity, object sensitivity, etc.
FlowDroid [41] detects sensitive information leakage with very high recall and pre-
cision. It supports context-, flow-, field- and object-sensitivity. However, it does not
support the ICC mechanism. DroidSafe [69] and IccTa [78], like FlowDroid, are devel-
oped on top of SOOT framework [77] and they are able to analyze flows between different
Android components. IccTa, based on FlowDroid and IC3 [87], detects flows of sensitive
data with a greater context sensitivity. DroidSafe represents the current state-of-the-art
for Android static analysis. It precisely models the Android runtime and its components
leveraging Object-Sensitive Points-To analysis.
However, static analysis approaches have problems in analyzing obfuscated apps (i.e.,
having string encryption and using Java reflection) and to capture dynamically loaded
code. These issues greatly limit the results of static analysis.
Previous works have proposed a combination of static and dynamic analysis to over-
come these limitations. AppAudit [107] is a program analysis framework that can dynam-
ically analyze apps detecting data leakage using taint analysis. The most relevant works
for TeICC are Harvester [93] and R-Droid [43]. They try to improve static analysis by
detecting implicit intra-component data flows using program-slicing based analysis. How-
ever, neither of them supports ICC; so they are not able to automatically analyze flows
between different Android components, which leaves the analysis incomplete. Moreover,
R-Droid cannot properly analyze apps in the presence of Java reflection.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing program-slicing based hybrid ap-
proaches [43,93] permit the analysis of ICC flows.
5.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented a targeted triggering approach, TeICC, to stimulate ICC in
Android apps. TeICC is based on a backward program slicing which in turn relies on a
SDG. The SDG based backward slice extraction technique used by TeICC enables it to
extract-then-execute target slices across multiple app components. Moreover, the iterative
hybrid approach allows TeICC to extract runtime values (i.e., reflection values, decrypted
strings, etc.) to enrich the original app. These runtime values help in performing improved
static analysis of obfuscated apps in the next iteration.
As a future work in this direction, we would like to provide support for content
providers. Moreover, we focus on different approaches to overcome current limitations.
For example, to address the extraction of slices involving native calls, we are analyzing
a novel approach using the ArtDroid [56] framework to intercept sensitive Java methods
called by native code.
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Chapter 6
Runtime Analysis of Dynamic Code
Updates
Obfuscation and complex nature of modern day feature-rich apps make stimulating an app
much harder in an analysis environment. Despite the robustness of the triggering mech-
anisms discussed in the previous chapter, and those found in the literature, it cannot be
safely stated about dynamic analysis to cover every code path in the app. Rather, the
outcome of dynamic analysis will always be an under-approximation of the complete be-
havior of the app. Malware developers exploit this intrinsic weakness of dynamic analysis
to evade the vetting process deployed at app markets.
In addition, apps - benign but having potential vulnerabilities - that pass analysis
check can become victims to on-phone exploitation by adversaries. In both these con-
texts, the analysis check at the app market becomes pretty much useless as the real
exploitation and malicious activity is only revealed once the app is installed and run on a
user’s device. Nevertheless, the malicious functionality has to be exposed at some stage.
Therefore, an on-phone analysis mechanism - which could analyze, detect and prevent
malicious behavior as it appears - could potentially solve the problems associated with
de-obfuscation, triggering and runtime exploitation of vulnerable apps. Involving the user
in the triggering process, in addition to the willingness of the malware to exhibit mali-
cious functionality once it is installed on a real user’s device, provides the best possible
environment to trap the malware.
In this chapter, we present an API hooking based app introspection mechanism to
analyze dynamic code updates as they appear in an app. The analysis mechanism is
implemented and provided as a library that can be easily included inside an app with-
out requiring the developer to modify anything in the app. We focus on detecting and
preventing on-phone exploitation of benign, but vulnerable, apps that involve dynamic
code updates. This solution is directed towards safeguarding apps and mobile users from
79
80 6.1. INTRODUCTION
on-phone exploitation of benign apps while relying on collaborative developers. In this
work, we only consider dynamic code updates, but the idea is more general and applicable
to other app activities as well.
6.1 Introduction
Moving away for static analysis of apps as it suffers from some inherent limitations such as
obfuscation and dynamic code updates; dynamic analysis comes to the rescue by provid-
ing solutions to these problems. However, it requires execution of the code paths that are
essential to understanding an app’s behavior. Interactive nature of mobile apps, environ-
ment specific triggers embedded in apps and the use of anti-debugging and anti-emulation
techniques used by malware developers are some of the features that limit the outcome
of dynamic analysis to an under-statement of the app’s complete behavior.
In the previous chapter, we discussed targeted execution of code paths that potentially
conceal malicious behavior. We presented a combination of static and dynamic analysis
techniques to ensure execution of the code paths that play a vital role to understanding the
app’s behavior. These techniques, along with others found in the literature [93, 94, 113],
shift triggering from a black-box mechanism to a rather grey-box or white-box mechanism
and advance the state-of-the-art in triggering to aid dynamic analysis of Android apps.
However, performing dynamic analysis of the already enormous number of apps, and
still rapidly increasing, is highly resource consuming, does not scale well and proves costly.
Consequently, it is hardly sustainable for newly established app markets. Moreover, there
are always chances of malware sneaking through the analysis check and infecting users’
devices. Moreover, malware can delay its malicious functionality as long as possible, but
it has to exhibit it at some stage once installed on a user’s device. Also, keeping in mind
the possibility of on-phone exploitation of benign but vulnerable apps by adversaries; it
is important to shift some part of the analysis to the end users’ devices which are getting
more powerful by the day. A runtime analysis, detection and prevention mechanism
could potentially solve the problem related to de-obfuscation, triggering and vulnerability
exploitation.
Traditional solutions in this direction can be seen in most of the antivirus products
which were designed keeping the resource constraint nature of mobile devices in mind.
Most of these antivirus products rely on signature based detection which can be easily
evaded by new variants of malware. Mobile devices, now more or less equivalent in
resources to a normal PC, allow for enhanced analysis solutions. Indeed, researchers have
shown the possibility of enhancement to on-phone analysis solutions [62]. However, they
either require changes to the Android framework, rooting the device or largely modifying
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developer’s code.
In this chapter, we present an API hooking based app introspection mechanism, Ap-
pIntrospector, that can be used to analyze, detect and prevent malicious activities that
involve dynamic code updates at runtime. We design and develop our runtime analysis
mechanism making use of some of the existing native level and Java level hooking tech-
niques. At the moment, we focus on analysis of dynamic code updates only, but the
concept is more generic and can be extended to monitor other type of runtime activities
too. The analysis mechanism is implemented in the form of a set of libraries which can
be easily included in apps without requiring the developers to modify their apps.
Contributions:
• We introduce a paradigm shift by moving part of the analysis of Android apps from
an artificial analysis environment to end users’ devices. Careful design, implementa-
tion and deployment of this type of solutions could pave the path to solving problems
like de-obfuscation, app stimulation and vulnerability exploitation at runtime.
• We investigate and provide a theoretical overview of some of the well known hooking
tools in security researcher’s community and techniques found in the literature.
• We design and implement an app introspection mechanism that leverages API hook-
ing to analyze, detect and prevent malicious activities that involve dynamic code
updates. Our analysis solution relies on minimal collaboration from the developers
and does not require any modification to the Android framework and rooting the
device.
6.2 Threat Model
This section describes the threat model, scope of this work and capabilities of an adversary.
As mentioned in the previous section, we only consider adversary exploiting vulnerabilities
in benign apps to remotely execute malicious code using dynamic code updates. This
adversarial activity is based on remote code injection vulnerability in the target app. We
consider two scenarios here.
• Adversary controls non-secure communication (app using HTTP instead of HTTPS)
performed by the app to download code packages over the network. We assume that
an adversary can launch a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack to replace the legit-
imate code with malicious code, which is later on loaded by the app and executed.
• The target app loads code from a world writable location on the device, such as SD
card, and the adversary has write access to that location. An adversary can replace
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the code which is to be loaded by the app with malicious code using a pre-installed
app that the adversary controls.
6.3 AppIntrospector
AppIntrospector is a code package that contains a set of libraries which an app developer
can embed inside the app. AppIntrospector gets activated when the app is launched and
analyzes, detects and prevents malicious code execution everytime the app uses dynamic
code updates.
6.3.1 Design Constraints
The scenario and the problem description impose certain constraints on the design of
AppIntrospector. These constraints are enlisted here and the possible solutions towards
the design and implementation of AppIntrospector are discussed later in the text in the
light of these constraints.
• C1: There should be minimal changes to the original app, if any.
• C2: There should be no changes to the underlying framework/kernel and should
not require flashing of the device.
• C3: The underlying libraries used by the apps or other third party libraries should
not change.
• C4: The solution should work on a not-rooted device.
6.3.2 AppIntrospector Overview
Android provides a set of native and Java level libraries as part of the framework. These
libraries can be accessed by an app using APIs provided by the framework. Figure 6.1
draws a high level picture of the app-framework interaction to perform various activities.
Features implemented as Java level framework libraries are generally accessed by calling
the Java level framework APIs as shown in Figure 6.1(a). Similarly, native level libraries
are usually accessed through higher level Java APIs, which in turn call the native func-
tions. Not all, but some of these native libraries can be accessed from the app code using
either native code or Java Native Interface (JNI). In addition, some of the framework fea-
tures are implemented as native level services, and are not accessible directly to the app
code. The app code makes use of Binder to access such services. Generally, the Android
framework provides Java level stub methods which abstract Binder interaction from the
developer.
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(a) Java Level Libraries (b) Native Libraries (c) Framework Services
Figure 6.1: App - Framework Interaction
The key design feature of AppIntrospector is to be included in the app code as a library
and use dynamic hooking to intercept API calls, such as calls to dynamic code update
APIs. Figure 6.2 presents a high level view of where AppIntrospector fits in the program
flow.
Figure 6.2: AppIntrospector
As a library, AppIntrospector is initiated when the app launches. AppIntrospector
initiation can be trivially accomplished by a minor modification (Step 1 ) to the app’s
entry point. AppIntrospector then consists of two main modules, i.e., a hooking module
and an analysis module. The hooking module then dynamically inserts hooks in the target
framework APIs and redirects them to enhanced versions of these APIs (Step 2 ).
After the initial instrumentation phase, the hooking module goes into dormant mode
and let the app execute according to its flow. Whenever the app makes a call to a target
API, in our case any of the dynamic code update APIs, the hook placed in the target
API shifts the execution flow to its enhanced version (Step 3 ). The enhanced version
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of the API basically utilizes the analysis module of AppIntrospector to analyze the state
of the API call, e.g., in the case of dynamic code loading, the analysis module checks the
code to be loaded for malicious content before handing it over to the actual dynamic code
loading API to load it into the memory (Step 4 ). AppIntrospector supports both pre-
and post-call analysis. As a result, the API call returns to the analysis module before
finally returning to the original app code (Step 5 and 6 ). Doing so, AppIntrospector
analyzes the code as it is being loaded, thereby, effectively nullifying the triggering prob-
lem. AppIntrospector maintains a state of the app and raises an alarm whenever the app
performs any suspicious activity.
6.4 Hooking Module
At the core of AppIntrospector, there lies the hooking module that is designed and im-
plemented keeping in mind the constraints discussed earlier. The hooking module helps
in redirecting API calls at runtime and thereby enabling the analysis module to check
the code to be loaded on the fly. In this section, we provide an overview of some of the
existing available hooking tools and then we discuss which among them - after necessary
modifications and enhancements - serve our constraints better.
6.4.1 Review of Existing Hooking Tools
Instead of reinventing the wheel, we thoroughly analyzed the capabilities of the existing
available hooking tools in order to find a suitable match and then use that as a base for
our hooking module. Table 6.1 provides a summary of the tools discussed in this section.
Table 6.1: Summary of Tool Specifications. Size: Lines of code approximately.
Tool Platform Arch Android Dalvik/ART Size
ELF-Hook Unix/Win x86 - - 800
Arminject Android ARM32 - - 2-3K
Adbi Android ARM32 4.2, 5.1, 6 Both 2-3K
SamsungAdbi Android ARM64 - - 40K
ArtDroid Android ARM32 - ART 3K
ArtHook Android ARM(32/64) 7 ART 3K
CydiaSubstrate iOS/Android - Upto 4.3 Dalvik -
Probedroid Android x86 5 onwards ART 3K
Frida All x86,ARM(32/64),MIPS - Both* 250K
ELF-Hook [100]: ELF-Hook is a tool that can be used to divert function calls made
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in a particular library to a modified function. It is based on patching the import tables,
such as the relocation table, to divert the control flow. It reads the ELF file of the
library and finds out the symbol of the function of interest in the symbol table. Based
on the index of corresponding function in the symbol table, the function entry is found in
relocation table and its offset is stored for later redirection. The offset for the modified
function is calculated which replaces the offset of the original function.
This tool provides a simple technique to hook native functions. However, it cannot hook
functions that do not have an entry in the relocation table. Therefore, a major portion of
the functions cannot be hooked.
Arminject [84]: Armijenct is based on almost the same technique as ELF-Hook.
However, instead of reading the library .so file from the disk, it reads from the process
memory and modifies relocation table for redirection. Therefore, it does not require
recompilation of the app. To read the memory of a process and perform modification,
Arminject uses an injection module to inject a hooking library in the address space of the
process. They make use of ptrace for performing injection.
It covers one aspect of our hooking module constraints, i.e., the hooking is performed
at runtime. Although, it requires a rooted device to inject the library into the app address
space, this constraint can be removed in our scenario as we include AppIntrospector inside
the app at development time. However, Arminject suffers from the same problem as ELF-
Hook.
Adbi [86]: Adbi stands for Android Dynamic Binary Instrumentaion. As the name
suggests, it can be used to inject code in the memory of an Android app. Similar to
Arminject, it uses a hijack module to inject a hooking library in the address space of
the app. However, it uses another technique, in-line hooking, to perform redirection. It
modifies the entry point of a function and makes it jump to the address of a modified
function which returns the control after performing the required processing.
Similar to Arminject, Adbi also requires a rooted device for library injection in the app
address space. However, this constraint can be avoided in AppIntrospector’s scenario. It
is a light weight tool and can be used to hook native functions on ARM32 architecture.
ArtDroid [56]: ArtDroid uses Virtual Table (vtable) tampering to divert virtual
method calls used in the Android framework to patched-methods that can perform further
analysis on the parameters of the original method call. The patched-methods can be coded
in Java and provided in the form of a DEX file. A part of ArtDroid also makes use of
Adbi (discussed above). ArtDroid uses similar concepts to Arminject and Adbi for library
injection.
ArtDroid fits well within the idea of the hooking module of Introspector and can be used
to hook some the dynamic code update APIs. However, the technique used in ArtDroid is
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limited to hooking virtual methods only.
ArtHook [11]: ArtHook uses the the quick compile code of the framework libraries
to hook Java level APIs. It accesses the code using ART representation of the methods
and divert calls to these methods to patched-methods. Once the actual method is hooked
and calls are diverted to a patched-method, ArtHook makes use of Java reflection to call
the original methods.
ArtHook betters the Java level API hooking in comparison to ArtDroid. It also supports
both ARM32 and ARM64 architectures. However, since it uses the Java reflection API
invoke to call the original function, it can fall into a loop if used to hook the reflection
API.
Samsung-Adbi [98]: SamsungAdbi is a more advanced version of Adbi capable of
injecting code into the app’s memory, perform in-line hooking for redirection and does
not require recompilation of the app. It is developed and maintained by Samsung Poland
R&D center. It makes use of the disassembler framework Capstone for disassembling the
instructions in the apps memory [16].
Samsung-Adbi is a more sophisticated tool that can be used to hook native functions.
However, keeping in mind the analysis module of AppIntrospector too, we do not consider
it suitable for the hooking module which we want to be as lightweight as possible.
CydiaSubstrate [18]: It can be used to modify Android and iOS apps, but it is not
open source. The authors provide their libraries in the form an SDK add-on. They provide
various C, Objective-C and Java APIs for hooking native function and Java framework
methods. The SDK can be used by developers and analysts to develop patched-methods
that could be used for analysis purposes. CydiaSubstrate is provided in the form of an
app that can be installed on a rooted device to divert API calls to the patched-methods.
It is a useful tool as it can be used to hook both native functions and Java framework
methods. However, it requires a rooted device and it is not open source. Moreover, even
the latest version of CydiaSubstrate only supports Dalvik runtime and can not be used with
Android versions greater that 4.3. Therefore, we do not consider it in the hooking module
of AppIntrospector.
Frida [23]: Frida is a multi-platform hooking tool and supports most of the hardware
architectures, i.e., x86, ARM32 and ARM64, MIPS, etc. It is based on the idea of
redirecting function calls to a trampoline by injecting a call to the trampoline. The
trampoline can perform the desired processing (logging, modifying the parameters, etc.)
and then transfer the control to the original function. This technique is also a form of
inline hooking. Frida is a very sophisticated tool which basically uses a JavaScript runtime
as an interface between the list-of-functions-to-hook and the underlying hooking engine
written in C.
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The fact that it already supports multiple platforms and architectures makes it very
attractive. However, its a huge project (more than 250K LOC). Therefore, it is not
trivial to modify its core engine and does not go well with the lightweightness constraint
of AppIntrospector’s hooking module.
ProbeDroid [99]: ProbeDroid is a dynamic Java code instrumentation tool for An-
droid. It is based on a technique similar to Frida that is to divert a function call to a
trampoline function which can perform analysis (log, modify, etc.) on the parameters and
return value of the function. It provides a platform for developers and analysts to craft
their own hooking tools. Based on a concept more or less similar to the tools discussed
earlier, it relies on a library injected into the app’s memory to hook Java method calls.
Tools like ProbeDroid can be modified a bit to make them inline with the idea of our
hooking module. ProbeDroid is a tool still under development and therefore lacks some
essential features, such as hooking native functions, etc. Moreover, it only targets Andorid
version 5 and above. At the time of the development of AppIntrospector (and even now),
ProbeDroid supported only x86 and ARM32 architectures.
6.4.2 Implementation
Keeping in mind the app-framework interaction discussed earlier in the text, the hooking
module is implemented to support both native functions hooking and Java API hooking.
AppIntrospector’s hooking module utilizes the concepts, and code with some modifications
and enhancements, used in three of the above mentioned hooking tools, namely Adbi,
ArtHook and ArtDroid. Figure 6.3 provides a block diagram of the hooking module.
Figure 6.3: AppIntrospector - Hooking module
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Native function hooking: As discussed in the previous subsection, Adbi uses inline
hooking technique to insert direct jumps in target native functions at runtime and divert
the flow of execution every time a target function is called. The hooking module of
AppIntrospector makes use of Adbi to hook functions in the framework native libraries,
such libc.so, libssl.so, etc. It is important for the hooking module to hook functions
in the native libraries because in some cases apps can directly invoke these functions
without calling the Java level framework APIs.
As the app launches and the hooking module of AppIntrospector initiates, Adbi looks
for the base address of the library that contains the target function, e.g., the base address
of libc.so for the connect() function. The base address is retrieved by traversing the
/proc/<pid>/maps file. Once the base address of the library is retrieved, the actual
address of the function in memory is computed using the ELF file of the target library.
The prologue of the function is saved and replaced with a direct jump to the patched-
method for redirection.
The original Adbi supports only ARM32 architecture. However, in the implementation
of the hooking module, we have extended it to support ARM64 as well.
Java API hooking: Not all of the features have a native level implementation or
expose native level functions to the app developers. These features are accessed using
the Java level framework APIs. Also, some of the framework services implemented on
the native level can only be accessed using Java level stub classes that rely on Binder.
Moreover, from Android 7.0 onwards, the framework imposes restrictions and declares
some native libraries as private that must not be accessed from the app code directly.
These libraries include well known native libraries used for secure communication and
encryption, i.e., libssl.so and libcrypto.so.
Therefore, it is important for the hooking module of AppIntrospector to hook Java
level framework APIs. In this work, since we are focusing only on dynamic code updates
that is accomplished mainly using Java APIs, we rely on Java level API hooking. AppIn-
trospector makes use of ArtHook to redirect Java level framework APIs. However, since
it uses Java reflection API invoke to call the original method once the patched-method
is called, it can fall into an indefinite loop if it is used to hook the invoke method itself.
To overcome this limitation, AppIntrospector uses the ArtDroid virtual table tampering
technique to hook the invoke method.
6.5 Analysis Module
The analysis module is the main part of AppIntrospector that deals with the redirected
API calls at runtime. In general, it can be modeled to monitor every app activity of
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dynamic nature. Malicious activities such as privacy leakage, SMS messages and calls
to premium numbers, etc., can be prevented through proper deployment of the analy-
sis module. Moreover, the concept of AppIntrospector is particularly useful in defying
adversaries to exploit app vulnerabilities.
In this particular work, we focus on securing apps in the presence of app vulnerabilities
that might lead to malicious code execution using dynamic code updates. An adversary
exploits these vulnerabilities for execution of malicious code in the context of the victim
app.
6.5.1 Dynamic Code Updates: API Selection
A first step in the implementation of the analysis module is to understand how an app
performs certain activities, which APIs are used and how can they be monitored. This
part of the text provides details about the APIs we selected to monitor dynamic code
updates.
Dynamic code loading: Apps can load additional code into their memory space
using framework provided APIs. The loaded code can be in the form .jar, .apk or .dex
file. Apps can also load native shared libraries. This part of the analysis tries to capture
the path to the code to be loaded and name of the file, etc. AppIntrospector can read
and analyze the code files before loading them once it intercepts the path and name of
the target file. To accomplish this task, the hooking module is presented with a list of
Java level framework APIs, and calls to these APIs are redirected towards the analysis
module.
Table 6.2: Code Loading APIs
Class Method Info
dalvik.system.BaseDexClassLoader <init> Dex Path
dalvik.system.DexClassLoader <init> Dex Path
dalvik.system.PathClassLoader <init> Dex Path
dalvik.system.DexFile <init> Dexfile Name
dalvik.system.DexFile loadClass Classname
dalvik.system.DexFile openDexFile Dexfile Name
java.lang.Runtime loadLibrary Native Library Path
Table 6.2 provides a list of the hooked dynamic code loading APIs. The arguments
retrieved by hooking these methods generally represent paths to the .zip, .jar or .apk
files containing a classes.dex file. This suites well with the idea of our previous work,
discussed in Chapter 4. The analysis module can take hold of the the code to be loaded
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and analyze it on the spot. Similarly, the java.lang.Runtime.loadLibrary() API is
called when a native library is loaded by an Android app from the Java level. Hooking
this API provides control over the path to the native library to be loaded. Although, our
current implementation of the AppIntrospector does not analyze native libraries, it can
still raise an alarm if the native code is loaded from a world writable location.
Instantiate Class and Invoke Methods: Apart from the dynamic code update
APIs that load code files, there are others that can be used to create instances of classes,
retrieve and invoke its methods by just providing the class names and method names.
Table 6.3 provides a list of such APIs that can help an app change its behavior at runtime.
Table 6.3: Instantiate Class and Invoke Methods
Class Method Info
java.lang.reflect.Constructor newInstance Class
java.lang.Class forName Classname
java.lang.ClassLoader loadClass Classname
java.lang.reflect.Method Invoke Method and Params
We selected these APIs to make the work inline with our previous solution on handling
dynamic code updates in an analysis environment (discussed in Chapter 4). Monitoring
these APIs gives an idea about the dynamic behavior of the app which is otherwise hard to
infer when statically analyzed. AppIntrospector can monitor the classes being instantiated
using APIs such as newInstance, loadClass and forName. However, keeping track of
the class objects is not sufficient for monitoring an app’s behavior.
The methods called by the app, the flow of their execution and the parameters passed
to the invoked methods are pivotal to app’s behavior. AppIntrospector hooks and an-
alyzes the reflection invoke API to detect possible malicious functionality obfuscated
through reflective method calls. AppIntrospector determines the method/framework API
being called using reflection and performs analysis on its sensitivity and its parameters.
Similarly, it is possible to keep track of the order of methods being called during an app’s
execution. This helps AppIntrospector to prevent malicious activities such as privacy
leakage.
6.5.2 Implementation
AppIntrospector’s analysis module is basically a collection of patched-methods and ana-
lyzers. Everytime a hooked API is called, the control moves to the corresponding patched-
method. Every patched-method uses one or more analyzer methods to perform the run-
time monitoring.
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Figure 6.4: AppIntrospector - Analysis module
Figure 6.4 illustrates the flow of execution starting from the initiation of an API call by
the app code. Call to the hooked methodX is intercepted by the corresponding patched-
methodX. The patched-methodX then interacts with one or more analyzer methods for
pre-call analysis as represented by Step 2 in the figure. After the pre-call analysis, the
control may or not transfer to the actual method depending upon the analysis results. De-
pending on the nature of the original method, the patched-methodX can call the analyzer
for post-call analysis as shown by Step 5 .
Listing 6.1 and 6.2 show example patched-methods for native functions and Java level
framework APIs, respectively. The native patch method is taken for the connect()
function of libc.so. Line 6 and 17 represent calls to precall and postcall analyzers,
respectively, whereas the original method is called in Line 13.
Listing 6.1: Native Patched Method Example
1 int patched -method -connect(int sockfd , struct sockaddr* addr , socklen_t len)
2 {
3 log("-----------patched -method for connect () called -----------");
4
5 //Call pre -call analyzer
6 analyzer -precall -connect(sockfd , addr , len);
7
8 //Call original method
9 int (* orig_connect)(int sockfd , struct sockaddr* addr , socklen_t len);
10 orig_connect = (void*)eph.orig;
11
12 hook_precall (&eph);
13 int res = orig_connect(sockfd , addr , len);
14 hook_postcall (&eph);
15
16 //Call post -call analyzer
17 analyzer -postcall -connect(res);
18
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19 // Return API call
20 return res;
21 }
Similarly, every call to the constructor of the class dalvik.system.DexClassLoader is
intercepted by the patched method patch-method-DexClassLoader-init(). It calls the
precall analyzer Analyzer.precall-analyzer-DexClassLoader-init() with the same
argument as received by the patched method that include path to code to be loaded
dynamically (Line 6 in Listing 6.2). The analyzer then takes care of the code file, i.e., an-
alyzes the path as well as the code itself. Based on the verdict of the analyzer, the patched
method calls the original method if nothing suspicious is found (Line 9 in Listing 6.2).
Listing 6.2: Java Patched Method Example
1 @Hook("dalvik.system.DexClassLoader -><init >")
2 public static void patch -method -DexClassLoader -init(DexClassLoader b, String
dexPath , String optimizedDirectory , String
librarySearchPath , ClassLoader parent){
3 Log.d(TAG , "-------patched -method -DexClassLoader Called ---------");
4
5 //Call pre -call analyzer
6 Analyzer.precall -analyzer -DexClassLoader -init(b, dexPath ,
optimizedDirectory , librarySearchPath , parent);
7
8 //Call original method
9 OriginalMethod.by(new $() {}).invoke(b, dexPath , optimizedDirectory ,
librarySearchPath , parent);
10 }
Depending upon the original method and the nature of its parameters, every ana-
lyzer perform different sort of analysis. For example, an analyzer corresponding to the
sendTextMessage() API checks the contents of the message for potential privacy leak-
age. Also, it checks if the message is sent to a premium number that might belong to an
adversary and cause monetary loss to the user.
The focus of this work, however, is analyzing dynamic code updates as they appear
in an app. In this regard, the analysis module of AppIntrospector contains analyzers
for code preliminary analysis, profiling app for possible information leakage and sensitive
APIs analysis when called using Java reflection.
Part of the preliminary code analysis focuses on the paths to the DEX file, optimized
directory and native library. A vulnerability in the app code loading functionality may
lead to malicious code loading. Therefore, it is important to infer and report if the app
loads code from world writable locations on phone. In addition, AppIntrospector follows
it up with analyzing the code to be loaded. The key part of the analysis includes looking
for sensitive information hard coded inside the code in plaintext. Moreover, it creates
a profile of the code package based on the classes and the APIs used. The profile helps
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AppIntrospector to mark the code package with a specific sensitivity level. In addition,
it also helps in detecting possible privacy leakage if the order of methods called includes
flow of information from source of sensitive information to corresponding leakage points.
AppIntrospector analyzes every method called using Java reflection that plays a major
role in obfuscation and widely used by malware developers to evade analysis tools. Every
method called using the invoke() API is exposed to multiple levels of analysis. In the
first level of analysis, the called API is checked for the level of permission that guards the
API. APIs guarded with dangerous permissions are subjected to further analysis specific
to each API. For example, as discussed earlier in the section, the sendTextMessage()
API is checked for its parameters to counter the SMS trojan malicious functionality. It is
also checked against the profile of the app for potential privacy leakage.
6.6 Evaluation and Discussion
Although the basic objective of this work is to analyze dynamic code updates to safeguard
mobile users from adversarial exploitation of possible app vulnerabilities, the concept of
AppIntrospector is more generic and can be applied to monitor most sensitive activi-
ties of dynamic nature. Therefore, the current implementation of AppIntrospector is
also tested for hooking functions from native libraries namely libc.so, libssl.so and
libcrypto.so. We also successfully tested our native level hooking extension to ARM64.
Most of the dynamic code updates APIs are hooked at Java level. We tested it on
multiple Android framework versions including Nougat, Marshmallow and Lollipop. The
hooking and analysis functionality are tested successfully with dummy apps corresponding
to each API. We deliberately injected dynamic code update vulnerabilities and malicious
contents in the loaded code and AppIntrospector successfully reported it. This was the
first basic level of evaluation of AppIntrospector. This ensures that the hooking and
target analysis functionality of AppIntrospector works according to the plan.
However, in order to thoroughly evaluate the applicability and usability of AppIntro-
spector, a full scale evaluation on AppIntrospector with real world apps is required. In
this regard, we plan to contact app developers who can include AppIntrospector in their
apps. Some of the key points the evaluation will then focus on are: 1) malicious con-
tents flagged by AppIntropspector, 2) performance of AppIntrospector in terms of CPU
and memory usage, 3) usability, and 4) the functioning of AppIntrospector without app
crashes. AppIntrospector is an ongoing work and we still await its full scale evaluation.
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6.7 Related Work
Most of the traditional as well as new antivirus solutions deploy one or other type of
on-phone malware detection mechanism. However, most of them rely on app package
scanning either at installation time or when a user initiates it. In most cases, they utilize
traditional signature based mechanisms that can be easily evaded by novel malware. Also,
they require a frequent malware signature database update to detect existing malware.
AppIntrospector follows a different runtime analysis based idea to circumvent exploitation
of vulnerabilities inside an app.
Very similar to the goal of this work, Falsina et. al. design an overlay library to secure
the DexClassLoader API [62]. However, our approach differs in a number of ways. We
use a hooking based mechanism, rather than providing a list of overlay APIs, that does
not require the developer to change any of the app’s code. Moreover, we use an analysis
based approach in contrast to their hash comparison based approach. Also, they only
consider code loading APIs whereas our approach focuses on reflection APIs as well and
can be used to target more generic problems.
Hooking or intercepting APIs/system calls has been used for various security enhance-
ments to the existing framework in the literature. Here we discuss a few of the very
relevant approahes. Traditional approaches rely on modifying the framework to inter-
cept API calls and add analysis code inside the implementation of the target methods.
Since the framework provides APIs for various functionalities, it is an intuitive solution
to instrument the framework APIs with the analysis code. The analysis code is executed
everytime the API is called. However, this solution requires device flashing and a rooted
device.
Boxify utilizes API hooking to run an app (untrusted-app) in an isolated process inside
the context of another app (monitor-app) [44]. An isolated process does not have any
privileges. Any privileges required are granted to the untrusted-app by the monitor-app
after certain security policy enforcement. Framework API calls by the untrusted-app
are intercepted by the monitor-app using reference tampering of Binder handles in the
memory of the untrusted-app. Similarly, system calls are intercepted using libc.so
hooking using a technique similar to the one used in AppIntrospector.
A different approach, however, is used in [109] where they hijack the app startup
process, change the environment variable of the app and redirect its framework API calls
to a modified (security enhanced) version of the framework. The modified framework file is
stored at a location readable for the app. The app startup process is hijacked by inserting
code in the app that invokes an environment reset procedure. The environment reset
procedure executes a modified version of the Zygote process using a native exec() that
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replaces the current Zygote process, replaces the location pointed to by the environment
variable and makes them point to the location of the modified framework files. The app is
then attached to the newly started process whose calls to the framework APIs are directed
towards the modified framework file. This process does not require the device to be rooted
and can work with inserting minimal code at the start of the app. However, the hooking
process may be different for different versions of Android depending upon how processes
are started and, therefore, it may not work with newer versions of Android. Also, unlike
AppIntrospector it requires a modified framework file.
Similarly, another approach for API hooking that is based on modifying the Zygote
process is the Xposed framework [36]. It can be used to hook method calls without modify-
ing the app or Android framework. Unlike the approach in AppIntrospector, i.e., injecting
code into an app’s virtual memory, the Xposed framework modifies the app process which
is started at the start of every process. Basically, it modifies Zygote, the center of ART
that is forked to start every new process, with a library that contains native methods to
hook certain methods called by the app process. Modifying Zygote, obviously, requires a
rooted devices and also affects all the apps installed on the device, which is clearly not
the goal of AppIntrospector and also goes against the defined constraints.
6.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented an API hooking based runtime analysis approach to counter
adversarial exploitation of dynamic code updates related vulnerabilities from within the
context of the app. The idea behind this work is to engage the end user in stimulating
the app and exploit the willingness of an adversary to reveal malicious behavior once the
app is installed on a real user device. We presented an overview of the existing hooking
techniques before providing the design and implementation details of AppIntrospector.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Directions
In this dissertation, we established an argument about the widespread use of dynamic
code updates in mobile apps; for extending apps’ functionality in benign apps and for
evading analysis and detection tools in malicious apps. We argued about the dynamic
nature of these techniques preventing static analysis tools to infer the behavior of the app
under analysis and we demonstrated this fact using a set of benchmark apps, reflection-
bench. Moreover, we presented the case of encrypted, obfuscated and only dynamically
available parameters, used in the dynamic code update APIs, being the root cause that
hardens static analysis.
We proposed a hybrid approach interleaving static and dynamic analysis and demon-
strated its ability to capture runtime behavior which is otherwise hidden to static analysis
tools. The evaluation results on real world apps motivate towards more hybrid approaches.
However, introducing dynamic analysis to the process requires efficient and effective app
stimulating mechanisms. To this end, we proposed a backward slicing based mechanism
for targeted execution of inter component code paths in Android apps. Moreover, to
eradicate the problem associated with app stimulating, although in restricted domain, we
propose an API hooking based app introspection mechanism for runtime analysis that
shifts part of the analysis from an artificial analysis environment to real users’ devices.
Engaging real users into the app stimulating process added with the willingness of mali-
cious apps to reveal their functionality once installed on a real user device effectively close
the triggering issue and nullify most of the anti-analysis techniques used by adversaries.
In the rest of the chapter, we discuss conclusions drawn from each individual part of
the work and their corresponding future directions.
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7.1 App Analysis in the Presence of Dynamic Code Updates
In Chapter 3, we established an argument that its not just the dynamic code updates that
lead to static analysis producing incomplete results, but a major part is played by the
analysis time unavailability of the parameters used in these dynamic code update APIs,
i.e., encrypted and decrypted only at runtime, read from files and received through the
network, etc. Our analysis results portrayed that there are certain definite patterns used
by malicious apps and profiling such patterns can help in telling apart malicious from
benign apps.
To counter the problem, we proposed StaDART, a hybrid analysis approach with in-
terleaving static and dynamic analysis, in Chapter 4. StaDART aids static analysis of
Android apps by resolving dynamic code updates dynamically. We demonstrated the ef-
fectiveness of StaDART using a set of real world apps. The MCGs created using StaDART
reveal much more information than their counterparts created using static analysis tools.
Consequently, StaDART can be used to unfold malicious behavior of dynamic nature.
A possible future direction for this part of the work is to enrich the static analysis part
of StaDART. Currently, it only supports construction of MCGs and performing basic
analysis on it, such as profiling based on the protection level of the APIs used in the
revealed part of the MCG. Adding other static analysis techniques to this part, such as
data flow analysis, would help in revealing other kinds of malicious behavior, e.g., privacy
leakage, etc.
7.2 Targeted Code Paths Execution in Android Apps
Solving issues that arise from code obfuscation and dynamic code updates, we argued
about the effectiveness of a hybrid approach. However, with the introduction of dynamic
analysis, there comes another challenging problem, i.e., stimulating the app to reveal
concealed behavior which is a non-trivial problem for automated analysis tools. To this
end, we presented the case of targeted code paths execution in Android apps, in Chapter
5. From a security analyst point of view, it is often not necessary to execute and explore
all of the app’s functionality. Rather, targeted execution of selected suspicious code paths
can prove to be a more effective, efficient, scalable and economical solution.
We presented the design and implementation details of our backward slicing based
mechanism, TeICC, for targeted execution of inter component code paths in Android apps.
Moreover, we further demonstrated the effectiveness of TeICC using a set of representative
obfuscated test apps. The idea behind TeICC’s design is more general than just dealing
with dynamic code updates and can be used to stimulate code paths leading to any target
API in the app. Malware analysts can use it to trigger various suspicious APIs in the app
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under analysis and understand its behavior.
Where we tested TeICC’s functionality with a small set of representative test apps, a
large scale analysis on real world apps would be more fruitful to determine the effectiveness
and efficiency of TeICC. We plan to use it to analyze a larger dataset comprising real world
benign and malicious apps. Utilizing TeICC for the analysis of apps from the official
Android market to detect possible hidden malicious content is one future direction. The
other is to make use of TeICC to check apps for possible vulnerabilities after identifying
potential vulnerable points in apps and then stimulating the code paths leading to them.
7.3 Runtime Analysis of Dynamic Code Updates
There is an on going and never ending race between malware developers to conceal ma-
licious functionality when analyzed in an analysis environment and security researchers
to design novel approaches to uncover and detect malicious behavior. Despite some very
robust security analysis approaches in practices these days, we can never rule out the pos-
sibility of malware penetrating the market and infecting user devices. Keeping in mind
the security threats and the now increasing capabilities of mobile devices, it is high time
to go for on-phone analysis solutions. To this end, we introduced our proposed API hook-
ing based app introspection mechanism, AppIntrospector, that analyzes dynamic code
updates on the fly. In this work, we focused on detecting and preventing exploitation
of vulnerable benign apps where the vulnerability involves some dynamic code update
features. We presented the design and implementation details of our runtime analysis ap-
proach in Chapter 6 and successfully tested its functionality with specially crafted apps.
Since AppIntrospector runs on users’ devices, special care needs to be taken as not to
overburden the device and exhaust its resources. Therefore, a large scale evaluation of
AppIntrospector on real user devices would help in shaping it better. It is an on going
work and we plan to perform such an evaluation for its effectiveness, efficiency, resource
consumption and its working without disturbing the actual app functionality on end users’
devices. Moreover, the current implementation of the analysis module of AppIntrospector
focuses only on analyzing dynamic code updates. A future direction is this regard is to
extend to the idea to other type of activity analysis and prevent exploitation of other
forms of apps’ vulnerabilities.
7.4 Closing Remarks
Most of the work discussed in this dissertation has already been published (or accepted)
in international conferences or in submission to international journals. A list of the pub-
lications is provided in Appendix A. Part of the work presented in Chapter 2 and 4 is
published in [110]. Similarly, most of the work presented in Chapter 3 is published in [37].
Moreover, part of work discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 is in submission to an interna-
tional journal. Also, the work presented in the Chapter 5 is accepted in an international
conference (paper 1 in Appendix A.2) and going to be published in April this year.
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